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74 SUMMARY 
The  main  purposes  of  this  investigation are  twofold:  a  study of  long-term 
trends  in  the  rate of profit  and  its components  in  British  industry  and 
secondly  to ascertain whether  or  not  there  is  a  connection  between  profit-
ability cycles  and  production  cycles. 
The  study  confirms  the  Long-term  fall  in  profit  rates  and  shows  the 
role  played  by  the  accumulation  of  capital.  It  is  particularly noticeable  that 
the  Latter  has  exerted on  profitability a  downward  pressure  greater  than  that 
which  has  resulted  from  wage  incre~ses.  Investment  outlay  has  thus  not  been 
"efficient"  in  the  sense  that  the  increase  in capital·per  employee  has  been 
more  rapid  than  its effects  in  terms  of  productivity growth. 
Inflation exerted a  perverse effect  on  industrial  profitability by  an 
unfavourable  movement  of  relative prices  (selling  prices  with  respect  to  fixed 
capital  prices  and  cost  of  living),  thus  giving  rise  to transfers of  potential 
profits  from  most  of  the  industrial  sectors  towards  the  equipment  goods 
sector  (especially construction),  trade  and  some  other  services. 
A comparison  of profitability cycles  and  production  cycles  shows  a 
correlation between  the  two,  the  peaks  and  troughs  of profitability generally 
anticipating  those  of  production. 
Throughout  the  period,  capital  accumulation  was  intensive:  the  expansion 
of  the  volume  of  fixed  capital  led  to  an  increase  in the  capital  intensity of 
production,  at  the  expense  of  employment.  This  trend  increase of capital 
intensity of  production  seems  to  result  from  the  very  nature  of  the  process 
of capital  accumulation,  where  the  aims  are  to  secure profits as  well  as 
increase  control  of  the  production  process.  As  investment  slowed  down  in 
the  1970s,  this  feature  of  British  investment  became  more  pronounced.  The 
main  purpose  of  the  modest  investment  carried out  was  to  introduce  highly 
capital-intensive techniques,  which  helped  to aggravate  the  unemployment 
problem. -1-
I.  INTRODUCTION 
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1.  This  paper  -which  is  a  part  in  a  wider  study on  profitability 
and  production  cycles  in  industry  in  the  four  Largest  Member  States  <1>  -
takes  as  its starting point  the  hypothesis  that  the  rate of profit  is one 
of the  chief  factors  explaining  the  fluctuation  in the  level  of activity 
of enterprises.  Consequently,  the  study of  long-run profitability trends, 
and  the  comparison  of profitability cycles  with  production cycles,  is  very 
useful  in  helping  us  to  understand  the  economic  crisis which  has  bedevilled 
the  western  world  for  a  decade.  Of  course,  the  importance  of  profitability 
does  not  mean  that  other  factors  of  comparable  weight  have  not  also  influenced 
the economy.  In  order  to understand  the  present  "crisis" satisfactorily,  we 
must  therefore  refer  to theoretical  models  which  are  far  more  complex  than 
one  which  merely  considers  profitability,  even  if profitability already 
subsumes  other  fundamental  explanatory  factors  (income  distribution,  capital 
accumulation,  productivity>. 
2.  In  economic  analysis,  the  relationship between  the  rate of profit  and  the 
Level  of  activity  is  treated  in a  variety of ways.  No  theory  assumes  a  direct 
link  between  the  two  variables,  but  usually  the  causal  linK  between  invest-
ment  and  production  is  acknowledged.  Investment  exerts  a  fundamental  influence 
on  production,  as  regards  both  aggregate  demand  and  supply,  through  the 
creation of production  capacity.  The  point  at  issue  is  how  to explain 
investment,  and  notably  the  influence of profit  on  capital  accumulation, 
and  hence  on  the  Level  of activity. 
In  the  neoclassical  model,  the  link between  profits and  investment  is 
merely  implicit  and  is situated within  the  framework  of the  technical 
possibilities of a  production  function  where  the  scope  for  more  or  less  continuous 
factor  substitution is  possible.  Ih  this  context,  investment  would  be  determined 
by  the  relative price of capital  (as  compared  w1th  labour),  in that,  when  this 
price  falls,  enterprises tend  to  invest  more,  and  thus  become  relatively 
<1>  The  case of  Italy is  analysed  in  document  II/63/82 of  February  1982  and 
the  case of Germany  in document  II/275/82 of  May  1982. -2-
more  capital  intensive  (1). 
In  the  cruder  versions  of Keynesian  theory,  the  role  of  profit  is more  explicit, 
although  it  is  placed  at  the  end  of  a  dynamic  process  which  is  chiefly determined 
by  other  factors.  In this "demand/investment"  model,  investment  is 
primarily  determined  by  demand  prospects  and  by  the  rate of utilization 
of production  capacity  (the accelerator principle).  The  resulting 
level  of activity  in turn determines  the size of the profits.  Profit  is 
thus  the  Last  link  in the  chain,  and  the  savings  of the  enterprise  come 
from  its  investments.  In  particular,  in the accelerator mechanism,  the 
only  profitability hypothesis  is that  at  the expected  level  of  production 
the  rate of profit  is sufficient  to  permit  the enterprise to continue  its 
activity. 
In  a  third model  -which  wiLL  be  called "profits/investment"-
the  sequence  is  reversed and  profit  plays  a  central  role.  Because  the 
objective of  an  enterprise is to  make  a  profit, profitability becomes  the 
motive  force  for  capital  accumulation;  it is then  the enterprise's saving 
(resulting  from  profit)  which  determines  investment,  and  not  the  reverse. 
This  model  thus  implies  a  correlation between  rate-of-profit  cycles  and 
production  cycles,  in that  the  former  should anticipate the  latter. 
There  will  normally  be  a  time  lag before  changes  in profits 
work  through  to  production,  because  it takes  time  to  implement  investment 
projects,and because  a  certain sluggishness  in the  corporate  decision-making 
process  may  entail  delays  in adjusting to  new  market  conditions. 
This  paper  starts by  defining  the  concepts  and  methods  used,  and 
then goes  on  to analyse  the  trends  of the  rate of profit  and  of its 
components  from  1959  to 1981.  Next,  it turns  to the empirical  verification 
of the  relationship between  profitability cycles  and  production  cycles.  The 
final  section studies the trends  of capital  accumulation  underlying  production 
cycles. 
(1)  More  generally,  it should  be  noted  that,  in neoclassical  theory,  the  position 
of profit  is a  curious  one.  The  starting point  for  the analysis  is the 
assumption  that  enterprises  are motivated  by  the  wish  to maximize  their 
profits or  net  worth,  as  shown  by  the  discounted value  of their  future 
profits.  Immediately  afterwards,  profit  in practice disappears  from  the 
analysis,  since it is eliminated by  competition.  On  this subject,  see the 
comments  of  M.  Obrinsky  (1981,  p.  495-496>. (2) 
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II.  CONCEPTS  AND  METHODS 
The  profitability indicator  chosen  is  the  rate of profit  on  capital 
advanced,  i.e. on  all  capital  which  contributes  to  production  (fixed capital 
and  circulating  capital).  Before  defining  this concept  of capital  in 
greater detail,  we  turn  first  to  the  measurement  of  the  numerator  itself. 
1.  The  national  accounts  enable  us  to  capture profits  in  a  variety 
of ways,  which  Lie  quantitatively between  two  boundaries;  gross  operating 
surplus  and  the  net  disposable  income.  The  process  of  moving  from  the 
first  of  these  to the second  is  illustrated in  Table  1,  which  gives  the  1970 
a~d 1980  figures  for  the  group  of non-financial  enterprises, similar data 
for  industry not  being  available. 
The  operating surplus  (gross  and  net)  is  an  indicator of the  return  on 
economic  activity,  whereas  net  disposable  income  - the  equivalent  of  net 
retained profits - is a  measure  of the  scope  for  self-financing  the 
widening  of the  production capacities.  The  gross  operating  surplus 
is thus  a  production concept  ;  disposable  income  becomes  relevant 
when  the structure of  financing  has  to be  determined. 
It  is arguable that,  in order  to  study the  long-term  profitability 
trends  and  to establish their  influence on  the  economic  cycle,  it is 
necessary to attach  greater  importance  to the  "production" aspect,  and 
therefore  to  take  the operating  surplus  into consideration.  The  return  on  eco-
nomic  activity  for  example  does  exert  a  determining  influence on  the establish-
ment  of corporate  plans  and  is an  essential benchmark  for  those  who  have  to 
finance  their  implementation. 
In  this  paper,  profit  is considered  from  two  viewpoints:  gross  (GOS) 
and  net.  The  gross  profit  is at  factor  cost  rather  than at  market  prices, 
to take account  of  the  fact  that  the  return of enterprises  is  influenced by 
subsidies.  Indirect  taxes  are  not  taken  into  account  because,  although  they 
form  part  of value  added,  they  are  paid directly to  the  State. -4-
Table  1:  Income  account  of  non-financial  enterprises  <NFE) 
1970  1980 
(%)  (%) 
e million  GOS  E million  GOS 
Value  added  at  factor  cost 
-Wages  (including social  contributions>(1) 
29  143 
21  745 
~ Gross  operating  surplus  (GOS)  7  398  100,0 
- Depreciation  2  909  39,3 
- Net  operating  surplus  (NOS)  4 489  60,7 
- Actual  interest,  net  1 690  22,8 
- Dividends  and  other  income  distributed,  net  1  051  14,2 
- Direct  taxes  1  368  18,5 
- Withdrawals  from  the  entrepreneurial  income  9  0,1 
of  NFE 
- Other  transfers,  net  (2)  - 44  -0,6 
Net  disposable  income  415  5,7 
107  605 
77  598 
30  007  100,0 
17  687  58,9 
12  320  41,1 
9  076  30,2 
1  045  3,5 
5  623  18,7 
40  0,1 
- 64  -0,2 
- 3 400  -11,2 
==================================== 
(1)  Because  the  ESA  makes  no  distinction between  wages  paid by  NFE  and  those 
paid by  sole proprietorships  (household  sector),  these  figures  have  been 
estimated on  the basis of the  1981  and  1982  Blue  Books,  in  proportion to 
the  GOS. 
(2)  The  difference  between  imputed  social  contributions  (resources)  and  social 
benefits  (uses)  is zero. 
Source:  EUROSTAT,  National  Accounts  ESA.  Detailed tables by  sector 
1970-1980,  Luxembourg  1982. -5-
Net  profit  was  obtained by  using  "economic ..  depreciation  (at  replacement 
cost)  (1),  calculated when  estimating  the  stock of fixed capital  (2). 
2.  Turning  to  the  denominator  ,  the  stock of  fixed  capital  used  is .the .net 
capital  at  the  half-year,  at  replacement  cost. 
It might  be  argued  that  it would  be  more  appropriate to use  gross 
fixed  capital  in order  to calculate the  rate of profit.  But  this  is not  the 
case,  because  gross  fixed  capital  is  not  capital  advanced:  the  fraction of 
fixed  capital  already written off,  if it still exists  in  its physical  form, 
has  already  been  incorporated  into costs  (depreciation)  and  recovered  by  the 
sale of products. 
3.  The  stock of  circulating  capital represents those funds which are permanently 
tied up  in the  ~  .. \:erprise  in order  to  finance  the  compensation  of the  Labour 
force  employed  during  a  production  period,and to  purchase  the  goods  and 
services  which  are entirely  consumed  during  the  production  cycle  (intermediate 
consumption).  It differs  from  fixed  capital  because  it is entirely  recovered 
at  the  end  of the  cycle of production  and  realization,  to be invested in it once 
more.  It  is therefore  important  not  to  confuse  the stock of circulating capital- the 
volume  of which  depends  on  the  length  of the said cycle  - with,  for  example,  the 
cash  requirements  which  stem  solely  from  the  fact  that  wages  are  paid weekly 
or monthly. 
(1)  The  national  accounts  perspective - which  is different  from  balance  sheet 
data,  at  historic costs  - gives  a  better p1cture  of reality:  the  replacement 
cost  technique  allows  for  the  fact  that  the  replacement  of  equipment 
involves  increased  costs because  of  inflation. 
(2)  Unlike  the  papers  on  Italy and  Germany,  there  seemed  no  point  here  in 
adjusting profits on  the  basis of an  estimate of the  earned  income  of 
self employed  persons,because  in British  industry they  account  for  a 
very  small  proportion of total  employment  (under  2%  for  total  manufacturing) 
and  this  remains  quite  stable over  time. -6-
Circulating  capital  may  be  considered either  from  the  t~chnical 
viewpoint  (the  capital  necessary,  which  must  be  advanced  in one  way  or 
another),  or  as  capital  financed  by  the enterprise  (1).  From  the  first  point 
of view,  the  only  one  considered  here,  it successively  takes  three  forms: 
(a)  productive  circulating capital,  which  consists of the  stock of  raw 
materials  and  other material  inputs,  as  well  as  the  labour  force; 
(b)  commodity  circulating capital,  which  is  made  up  of stocks  of work  in 
progress  and  finished  products,  including transported goods.  Their 
value  includes  wages,  raw  materials  and  other  types  of  intermediate 
consumption; 
(c)  monetary  circulating capital,  obtained  from  the  sale of  the  stock of 
finished  goods. 
Each  form  is  converted  into the  next  through  the activities of 
production,  acquisition and  realization,  which  give  rise to  flows  <inter-
mediate  consumption,  wages,  receipts  from  the sale of finished  products). 
There  is  therefore a  one-to-one  correspondence  between  flows  and  stocks, 
which  means  that  changes  in  stocks  are  accurately  reflected  in  flows. 
In  the  case  which  concerns  us  here,  the  problem  is  to  as~ess the 
fraction of annual  flows  of  wages  and  intermediate  consumption  which  is 
tied up  in the  enterprise  in  relation to  the  Length  of acquisiton,  production 
and  marketing  periods.  This  means  that one  must  know  the  rate of turnover 
of circulating  capital  (!_),  i.e. the  number  of times  a  year i·n  which  the 
advances  in question are  recovered.  Because  this  information  is  not 
recorded  in the statistics, it was  estimated as  follows: 
(1)  The  sometimes  considerable difference between  "financial" and  "technical" 
circulating  capital  is due  to the  credit  which  the enterprise  receives 
(through  banks,  suppliers, and  advances  by  customers)  or which  it grants 
<to  customers  and  by  advances  to suppliers). r  =  IC+W 
ST 
(1) 
where  IC  =  intermediate  consumption 
-7-
(I) 
W  =  wages  and  salaries  <hereinafter  "wages") 
ST  =  average  annual  Levels  of stocks  of  raw  materials,  finished 
products  and  work  in  progress<hereinafter  "stock  Levels")  <2>. 
This  definition of L therefore  implies  that  the  number  of times  in  which 
circulating  capital  for  wages  and  circulating capital  for  raw  materials  is 
recovered  corresponds,  on  average,  to  the  ratio of stock  renewal  to total 
costs.  This  hypothesis,  the only  one  possible  in  the  absence  of data,  is 
thus  an  approximation  to  the  underlying  real  magni~udes. 
4.  The  formula  for  the  rate of profit  on  capital  advanced  used  in  this 
paper  is the  following  (see  Levy-Garboua  and  Weymuller  1981,  page  113>,in 
which  all  magnitudes  are  at  current  prices: 
p  =  s  s  1 
=  W  r  ~1__.;..+-s  a- (II) 
where  s =  profits  (operating  surplus) 
K =  stock of net  fixed  capital  at  replacement  costs,  at  the  half-year 
r =  rate of turnover  of circulating  capital 
(1)  In  reality,  two  rates  of turnover  would  be  needed  - one  for  circulating 
capital  for  raw  materials  (rm),  and  another  for  circulating capital  for 
wages  <r  )  -because the  per1ods  during  which  they  are  tied  up  do  not 
exactly wcoincide.  However,  the  data  available did not  permit  this 
refinement  in  calculating the  rate of profit, and  it is therefore  assumed 
that: 
r  = r  = r  w  m 
(2)  ST  is equal  to  the arithmetic  mean  of stock  Levels  at  the  beginning  and 
end  of each  year,  at  current  prices.  This  mean  is virtually the  same 
as  the  similar  mean  which  is obtained  from  national  accounts  data,  where 
stocks  are  valued at  the  constant  prices of the year.  In  order to  calculate 
the  changes  in  stocks  in  the  national  accounts,  the end-of-year  stocks 
are deflated by  the  rise  in  prices  for  the period,and the  reverse  is 
applied to  the  beginning-of-year  stocks.  As  a  result,  even  in periods 
of high  inflation the  differences  between  the  mean  at  current  prices  and 
the  mean  at  constant  prices  are tiny. -8-
sa = indicator of the  structure of accumulation 
=  K +  (IC/r) 
W/r 
s/W  = income  distribution ratio 
(III) 
Formula  II shows  that,  for  a  given quantity of  value  added,  the 
rate of profit  is  a  function  of three  elements: 
-income distribution  (S/W); 
-the rate of turnover  of circulating  capital  (~), which  reflects  the 
relative size of this  part  of the  capital  advanced.  A steady  rise 
in~ reflects greater efficiency  in stock  management  just as  much  as 
technical  changes  inside or outside the  sector  concerned  (e.g.  improved 
transport  conditions)  which,  by  reducing  the  relative amount  of 
circulating  capital,  have  a  favourable  effect on  profitability; 
- capital accumulation,  as  summarized  in  the  indicator  sa  (structure of 
accumulation).  The  changes  in  this  indicator- which  reflects  the 
introduction of technical  progress  into the  economy  - show  the  extent  to 
which  accumulation  exerts  downward  pressure on  the  rate of profit.  Such 
pressure  is exerted when,  all other  conditions  being  equal,  the  indicator 
~increases as  a  result of a  dynamic  process  caused  by  competition. 
There  would  then be  an  "overaccumulation" of capital  relative to  the 
sector's profit opportunities.  We  shall  return  to  this aspect  below  (1). 
Formulae  II and  III could  be  further  broken  down  to  include  the 
rate of capacity utilization.  This  element  -which  is  very  important  in 
order  to  explain  the short-term  fluctuations  in  profitability  (i.e.  within 
cycles)  - has  been  ignored  here,  since the purpose  of the  paper  is to study 
the  long-term  changes  and  their causes.  The  long-term  dynamics  of the  rate 
of profit  and  of the  indicator of the structure of accumulation  would  not 
be  affected by  the  rate of capacity utilization unless  it showed  a  long-term 
upward  or  downward  trend.  This  is not  usually  the  case,  since  positive 
cyclical  changes  in  the  rate of capacity utilization are offset  by  negative 
(1)  We  shall  also  see  that  sa  can  also  grow  in  relationship with  the 
interaction between  the-rncrease  in  wages  per  person  employed  and  the 
choice  of productive  techniques. -9-
ones  (1). 
5.  Formula  II offers at  least  two  advantages  over  the  indicators  most 
frequently  used  in  macroeconomic  studies  (wage  share  in  value  added  and 
return on  stock  of  fixed  capital).  The  first  advantage  stems  from  the  fact 
that  formula  II gives  more  information  than  the  wage  share,  since  we  have 
just  seen  that  it can  be  broken  down  into an  income  distribution  ratjo and  an 
indicator of the  structure of accumulation.  The  second  advantage  is  that 
it takes  account  of circulating capital,  which  not  only  is  an  important 
factor  for  the study of economic  fluctuations,  but  makes  inters.ectoral 
comparisons  of  rates  of profit  more  meaningful.  Since  the  proportion of 
fixed  capital  varies  appreciably  from  one  branch  to  another,  if we  do  not 
consider  the  capital  advanced  as  a  whole,  any  comparison  of profitability 
levels  is  not  very  meaningful. 
Formula  II corresponds  to the  rate of profit of fixed  capital  plus 
stock  levels, since  under  the  United  Kingdom's  accounting  rules  the  value  of 
stocks  of  finished  products  does  not  include  expected profits  (2). 
Nevertheless,  the  above  analytical  breakdown  (which  takes  intermediate 
consumption  and  wages  into  consideration>  has  potential  interest  and  is 
worth. identifying  in quantitative terms. 
(1)  Of  course,  this  is valid only  for  fluctuations  in  the  rate of  capacity 
utilization that  are  related to  the  economic  cycle.  To  this must  be 
added  the  "structural" surplus  of productive  capacity,  resulting  from 
the  fact  that,  since  1973,  certain plant  has  become  obsolete as  a  result 
of the  higher  energy  prices.  Since  the statistics  for  capital  stock do 
not  take sufficient account  of this  factor,  part  of the  increase  in capital 
per  person  employed  is  due  to this statistical bias  rather  than to 
technical  changes. 
(2)  Thus  they  are  valued  according  to  the  FIFO  method,  "at  the  lower  of cost 
or  realizable value"  (Maurice,  1968,  page  402>. -10-
6.  The  indicator of  the  structure of accumulation  might  seem  somewhat 
ambiguous,  since at  the  same  time  it  reflects  the effects of technology  and 
of  income  distribution  (1).  Nevertheless,  it does  have  the  advantage  of 
establishing a  relationship between  these  two  factors,  which  are often  inter-
dependent  and  may  exert  conflicting  pressures  on  profitability.  All  things 
considered,  it therefore  seems  preferable to  formula  V,  which  takes  account 
of technology  only. 
In  order  to  show  the  contradictory effect of the  elements  which  determine 
the  indicator ~, let  us  express  formula  III  in terms  of the  capital  intensity 
of production.  This  can  be  done  from  two  points of view,  one  which  emphasizes 
the  efficiency of technological  change,  and  the other  the  interaction between 
technological  change  and  income  distribution. 
<1>  To  avoid  this drawback,  some  authors  break  down  the  rate of profit  as 
follows: 
- s  =  s  VAV  PVA  (IV)  p-- KAV  •  PKA  KA  VA 
Where:  KA  = capital  advanced,  at  current  prices 
VA  = value  added,  at  current  prices 
v  = volume 
PVA  and  PKA  = price of  value  added  and  of capital  advanced. 
When  the  rate of profit  is  presented  in this  way,  the  indicator of  the 
structure of accumulation  is  replaced  by  the  following  expression: 
where: 
=  VAV  •  PVA  = 
ca  KAV  PKA 
KAV 
L 
-1  (VAV  )  PVA 
L  PKA 
L  = number  of  employees 
(V) 
We  shall  see  that  formula  V is only  a  part  of the  indicator of the 
structure of accumulation  used  here. (3) 
-II-
Taking  the first  approach,  we  have:  (1) 
-1  _  QT  PKA  (W/r) 
sa  - PDT  ffi  VA 
where  QT  = capital  intensity of production =  KCAV/L 
PDT  = labour  productivity =  VAV/L 
(VI) 
The  influence of technology  can  be  seen  in the term  (QT/PDT>,  which 
records  the  net  effect of  technological  change  and  of its  impact  on 
productivity.  When  the growth  of the  capital  intensity of production  is 
greater than  the growth  of the productivity associated with  it  (QT/PDT  increases), 
the  indicator  sa  is subject  to upward  pressure  (and  the  rate of profit to 
downward  pressure>:  accumulation  is  not  efficient, since the  improvement 
to productivity  requires  too  much  capital. 
This  initial  impact  is  rectified by  two  factors:  (a)  the movement 
of the  relative prices of capital  advanced,  which  reflects the  strength of 
the  investment  goods  sector  relative to the others;  and  (b)  income 
distribution,  adjusted by  changes  in  the  relative proportion of circulating 
capital  for  wages  (W/r).  A rise  in L  (fall  in the proportion of circulating 
capital)  pushes !!  upward,  because  it reduces  the  influence of the wage 
share  in value  added  (the  last  term  of  formula  VI  increases>,  and  hence  gives 
greater  importance  to  fixed  capital. 
The  evolution  of the  indicator of the structure of accumulation  is thus 
the outcome  of a  set of factors  which  do  not  all  necessarily act  in the  same 
direction.  The  fact  that  their action  is  synthesized  in a  single  indicator 
is a  strong  point  which  makes  it more  useful  than others  for  analyzing 
profitability.  For  example,  if we  note  that  sa  is  not  increasing,  and  that 
at  the  same  time  the  rate of profit  is  falling,  we  can  immediately  discard 
(1)  For  this purpose,  it is sufficient  to multiply and  divide  formula  III 
by  the  number  of  employees  (L)  and  by  the value  added  at 
constant  prices  (VAV)  respectively,  and  to take  account  of the  change-
over  from  aggregates  at  constant  prices to aggregates  at  current  prices: 
VA  = VAV  • PVA 
KCA  =  KCAV  •  PKA 
where  KCA  = stock of  fixed  capital  and  circulating capital  for  raw 
materials  advanced,  at  current  prices= K +  (IC/r). - 12-
the  hypothesis  that  this  fall  is due  to an  "overaccumulation"  of capital. 
By  constrast,  if we  had  taken  into consideration only  the  ''changes  in 
technologies"  aspect(formula  V),we  would  have  arrived at this  conclusion 
only  if the term  QT/PDT  had  fallen or  remained  stationary.  If it increases, 
all that  we  learn from  formula  V is that  technology  exerts  downward 
pressure on  profitability.  There  is therefore  no  way  of  immediately 
establishing,  as  in the  case  of  formula  VI,  whether  this first  stimulus 
has  become  less  important  because  of the  upward  movement  of wages. 
The  other  way  of breaking  down  the  indicator of the structure of 
accumulation  is the  following: 
where: 
QT 
sa  =  ~R-W-L--:-1-r 
PKA  •  PC 
RWL  = real  wages  per  employee 
PC  =  consumer  prices  index 
(VII) 
As  stated earlier, this presentation of!! shows  in particular the 
possible  interaction between  technological  change  (which  is statistically 
reflected  in  QT)  and  income  distribution.  For,  while  it can  be  taken that 
the search  for  productivity gains  gives  rise to a  trend  increase  in  the 
volume  of capital  per  employee  (indicator  QT),  income  distribution probably 
influences  this  trend also.  Thus,  enterprises  can  react  to  real  or  expected  rises 
in nominal  wages  by  introducing  more  capital  intensive or  labour  efficient  tech-
nological  advances  which  increase  productivity.  Thus  in this  schema,  rising 
wages  accelerate the  tendency  to  increase the capital  intensity of  production. 
Furthermore,  the  upward  movement  of  the  real  wage  creates outlets  for  the  addi-
tional  goods  resulting  from  increased productivity.  Wage  increases  are  thus  both 
a  motive  for  achieving  productivity gains  and  a  condition  permetting  them  to 
take  place. 
Lastly,  before  concluding  this  section,  it may  be  useful  to  provide 
further  information  on  the  mechanisms  by  which  capital accumulation  can  exert 
a  downward  pressure on  the  rate of profit. 
7.  Here  it  should  be  noted  that  when  an  oligopolist  increases  QT,  a 
competitive  struggle  is  likely,  culminating  in an  increase  in capital  intensity 
throughout  the  branch  and  a  reduction  in the  rate of profit.  The  increase  in 
the  profit  margin  (difference  between  unit  prices  and  costs)  resulting  from 
the  new  techniques,enables  the  innovator  to bring  down  prices;  in order  to  preserve -13-
market  shares,  his  competitors  react  by  investing  in  the same  techniques 
and  adjusting their prices.  The  result  is a  chain  reaction affecting 
both  the organization of production  (choice of techniques)  and  pricing 
policy,  the  possible outcome  of which  is  indicated above. 
Let  us  now  examine  the  empirical  results.  Annex  I  gives 
details of the  source of data,  calculation methods  and  the  grouping  of 
branches  by  Large  sectors:  sector I,  investment  goods;  sector  II, 
intermediate goods;  sector  III,  consumer  goods. 
Part  I 
III.  LONG-RUN  PROFITABILITY  TRENDS 
1.  Gross  and  net  rates of profit on  capital  advanced  and  the gross 
rate of profit  on  the stock of fixed  capital  followed  very  similar trends 
«or an  example  see  Figure  1).  (1) 
Figure  1:  The  rates of profit 
Total  industry  (including  construction> 
--'0  UOSS  ON  FIXED  CAPITAL 
-- &ROSS  OH  CAPITAL  ADVANCED 
-·  NET  ON  CAPITAL  ADVANCED 
tt.l 
13.3 
11.2 
4 
...  lt&l  1154  191&  19&8  19?t  1'1?2  J974  1976  1978  ,..  IWJ 
(1)  The  only  notable  divergence  was  in the energy  products  sector,  where  net 
profitability showed  much  wider  fluctuations than the other  two  rates of 
profit. - 14-
Consequently,  unless otherwise stated,  the  terms  "rate of profit" and 
"profitability" henceforth  refer to the  net  rate of profit  on  capital 
advanced. 
2.  All  sectors,except  construction and  energy  products,showed  a 
long-run  downward  trend  (Table  2  and  Figure  2>.  This  feature of the British 
economy  is well  known,and  an  analysis of the main  studies on  the subject 
is given  in the  Annex. 
The  downward  trend  was  steepest  in the  investment  goods  sector 
(excluding  construction>,  where  the  rate of profit dropped  by  an  average 
8.1%  per  year  <Table  2>.  Over  the whole  period the  decline  was  the  least 
marked  in the  intermediate goods  sector(-2.3% per  year;  see  Table  2>. 
Two  sub-periods  may  be  distinguished.  Prom  1959  to 1975  profitability 
followed  the  same  declining  trend as  in the other sectors,  whereas  between 
1976  and  1981  the  trend  was  reversed,  so  that  in 1981-the  rate of  prQfit  was 
higher  than  its 1959  level.  This  reversal  was  due  to  the  impact  of  the  energy 
products  sector.  This  sector,  like construction,  shows  a  trend profile 
which  sharply differentiates it from  the other sectors.  Before  the  North 
Sea  deposits  were  exploited,  profitability in the energy  products  branch 
fluctuated around  a  low  and  level  trend  (on  average  the  net  return on 
capital  advanced  from  1959  to 1973  was  2.3%).  After  the sharp drop  in 
1974,  when  net  profitability became  negative  (-0.1%>,  there  was  a  very 
rapid  rise,  and  by  1981  the  rate of profit  was  the  highest  for  industry 
(excluding  construction>. 
From  1959  to  1972  the  rate of profit  for  construction  (characterized 
by  extremely  high  profitability  levels  compared  with  the  rest of  industry  <1>> 
followed  a  very  strong  upward  trend.  After  the  sudden  fall  over  the period 
1974-77,  which  brought  the  rate of profit  down  to the  level  of the  late 
(1)  The  difference  is due  to the  fact  that this branch  requires  relatively 
little fixed  and  circulating capital. - 15-
Table  2 
Exponential  trend of profitability 1959-81  (1) 
r2 
trend  level  (2) 
a  b 
1959  1981 
Investment  goods 
a)  excludi-ng  construction 2  .• 69  -0.081  0-558  13.5  2.3 
(-5.15) 
b)  including  construction 2.72  -0.014  0.287  14.9  11.1 
(-2.91) 
Intermediate goods  1.  91  -0.023  0.181  6.6  4.0 
(-2.16) 
Consumer  goods  2.90  -0.053  0-790  17-2  5.4 
(-8.88) 
Manufacturing  2.79  -0.071  0.764  15-1  3.2 
(-8.25) 
Total  industry  2~35  -0.024  0-485  10-3  6-1 
(including  construction)  (-4.45.) 
(1)  Regressions  on  the  exponential  function: 
rp = a  e bt  or  log  rp = log  a  + bt  , 
where:  rp =  net  rate of profit  on  capital  advanced 
t  = time  (1,2,  •••  ,  23) 
the  figures  in brackets are  Student's t. 
Since  the  residuals  are autocorrelated,  a  rigorous  hypothesis test  is 
not  possible. 
(2)  Anti-logarithm of the theoretical  value  resulting  from  the  regression. 
============================================================================= 
Table  3 
Comparison  of  rates  of profit  (1) 
Rate  of profit on  Gross  rate of profit 
capital  advanced  on  fixed  capital 
net  gross 
rate of  index  rate of  index  rate of  index 
change  1981 
Investment  goods 
change  1981  change  1981 
a)  excl.  construction  - 8.1  14.6  - 4.9  33.2  - 4.6  35.7 
b)  incl.  construction  - 1.4  68.3  - 1.1  76.1  - 0.9  77.6 
Intermediate goods  - 2.3  101 .1  - 0.5  * 115.5  - 1.0 *  104.1 
Consumer  goods  - 5.3  22.1  - 3.6  38.8  - 4.5  31.9 
Manufacturing  - 7.1  12.8  - 4.3  32.4  - 4.7  29.6 
Total  industry  - 2.4  70.7  - 1.2  87.1  - 1.6  79.1 
(including  construction) 
(1)  The  rate of change  is that  of the  exponential  trend  for  1959-81  multiplied 
by  100.  The  parameters  for  which  Student 1s.t is  less  than  2  are  indicated 
by  an  asterisk.  The  index  for  1981  is established by  taking  1959  as  the 
base  year. -16-
FIG.2  - RATE  OF  PROFIT  AND  ITS  COMPONENTS  (indices 1959•100) 
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- 19-
1960s,  profitability was  maintained at  comfortable  Levels  (1).  If this 
branch  is  included  in the  investment  goods  sector,  the  sharp decline  noted 
above  is  Largely  levelled out,  as  the  rate of profit  for  sector  I  falls 
by  only  1.4% per  year  (relative to  the  exponential  Long-term  trend).  From 
1959  to 1974,  it  follows  a  very  regular  "saw  toothed"  path,  the  fluctuations 
until  1970  being  highly  regular. 
It is  worth  emphasising  that  the  results described  here,  as  well  as 
those  relative to  the  indicator  of  the  structure of accumulation  (paragraph 
IV),  depends  heavily  on  the  capital  stock  evaluation,  particular~y pest 
1973.  As  already  noted,  the  statistics of this  aggregate,  reflect  only 
imperfectly  the  situation created by  the  increases  of  energy  prices,  which 
reduced  the  present  value  of that  part  of capital  which  is energy-specific. 
Moreover,  the  Low  degree  of  capacity utilization must  have  exerted a  very 
important  influence  in  the  second  half of  the  seventies. 
3.  The  growing  burden  of  depreciation  had  a  substantial  influence 
on  the  movement  of  the  rate of profit,  net  profitability having  declined 
much  more  than  gross  profitability  (2)  (Table  3).  The  sector  where  the 
(1)  For  example,  in  1981  net  profitability in  construction was  49.1%  as 
against  1.6%  in manufacturing.  ' 
(2)  This  influence of depreciation  is  not  connected  with  the  rising  cost  of 
investment  goods  for,  at  constant  prices,the share of depreciation  in 
gross  value  added  exhibits  much  the  same  trend as  this share at  current 
prices.  For  example,  for  total  industry  (including  construction)  the 
share of depreciation  in  value  added  at  constant  prices  was  7.9%  in 
1959  and  15.1%  in  1981;  at  current  prices  these  percentages  were 
respectively 8.0%  and  14.3%. -20-
relative decline of the  net  rate of profit  was  the most  marked  was  the 
intermediate goods  sector,  where  the drop  in net  profitability was  4.6 
times  greater than  the  decline  in gross  profitability on  capital  advanced 
(Table  3>.  This  is the sector  in  which  the  proportion of gross  added  value 
absorbed  by  depreciation  was  the  highest:  12%  in  1959  and  20.6%  in  1981 
(at  current  prices>,  against  8%  and  14.3%  respectively  for  total  industry 
(including  construction>. 
Here  too  energy  products  and  construction  have  a  different  behaviour 
than  the rest  of  industry.  In  the  former  branch  depreciation accounted  for 
a  decreasing  proportion of value  added  since  1975,  and  this  reduction  is  much 
greater  when  related to gross  profits.  Thus,  over  the  last  seven  years, 
net  profitability increased much  more  than  gross  profitability. 
In  construction,  the  net  and  gross  rates  of profit  on  capital 
advanced  followed  almost  identical  paths,because depreciation accounted 
for  a  relatively stable share of gross  profits. 
4.  Profitability in the  consumer  goods  sector  has  almost  always 
exceeded  that  of total  industry,  although  the  difference  narrowed 
substantially  in  the  last  ten years  (see  the  annexed  tables  showing  the 
rate of profit  and  its components>.  From  1959  to 1970  the difference  was 
3.6 percentage  points on  average,  whereas  from  1971  to 1978  the difference 
was  only  1.8 percentage  points.  In  the  period  1979  to 1981,  the  difference 
became  negative. 
During  the  1960s,  the  investment  goods  sector  excluding  construc-
tion  showed  profitability  Levels  very  close to those of total  industry: 
for  1959  to 1969  average  difference  was  virtually nil.  After  1970 
profitability in this sector  was  below  that  of total  industry.  This 
negative  difference  widened  over  time;  between  1970  and  1981  it averaged 
-2.8 percentage  points. 
In  constrast,  construction exhibited substantial  and  increasing 
positive differences:  32.7  percentage  points on  average  between  1959  and 
1970,  46  points between  1971  and  1981. 
Profitability in the  intermediate goods  sector  remained  consistently 
below  that  of total  industry,  except  in 1981;  the average  difference  was 
-3 percentage  points  in the  1960s  and  -2.3 points  in the 1970s.  The  energy 
products  branch  recorded  Larger  negative differences,  which  nevertheless 
narrowed  over  time  and  became  positive  in  the  Last  three years. -21-
IV.  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  ACCUMULATION  AND  ITS  COMPONENTS 
1.  The  indicator of the structure of accumulation  which,  as  we  shall 
see  later,  exerted  an  important  influence  on  the  movement  of profitability, 
generally  followed  an  upward  trend  (see  Tables  4 and  5).  For  total 
industry  (including  construction)  this  indicator  in  1981  stood  80%  higher 
than  in  1959,  while  for  total  manufacturing  it was  44%  higher.  The  sector 
showing  the greatest  increase  was  intermediate goods,  where  th~ level  at 
the  end  of  the  period was  more  than  two  and  a  half times  that  at  the  beginning 
of the  period.  In  the  investment  goods  sector excluding  construction,  however, 
the  level  fell,  but  the  trend appears  almost  flat  if construction is  included.  In 
this  sector, therefore,  unlike  the  rest  of  British  industry,  the structure 
of accumulation  - that  is, the  proportions  in  which  capital  is  invested 
in the  form  of  fixed  capital  and  circulating capital  for  raw  materials 
on  the  one  hand,  and  in  the  form  of wages  on  the  other - did  not  exert  any 
depressing  influence  on  the  rate of profit. 
2.  If the  first method  of breaking  down  the  indicator of the structure 
of accumulation  is  used  (formula  VI),  we  see  that,  in general,  the  net 
effect  of  technological  change  was  to  increase  the  value  of  the  indicator, 
which  thus  depressed  profitability.  For  total  industry,  and  for  the 
intermediate goods  and  consumer  goods  sectors,  the  ratio of the  capital 
intensity of production  (QT)  to  productivity  (PDT)(1)  showed  a  Long~run 
upward  trend  (see  for  example  figure  3).  Accumulation  therefore  was  not 
efficient  in the sense  that  the  increase  in  capital  per  employee  was 
reflected  in a  smaller  rise  in productivity  (2). 
(1)  The  ratio between  these  two  indicators gives  the  capital  coefficient 
(fixed  capital  and  circulating capital  for  raw  materials  per  unit  of 
output,  at  constant  prices):  QT  KAV  L  KAV 
-=--·-=- PDT  L  VAV  VAV 
(2)  d QT  )  d PDT 
dt  dt -22-
Table  4: 
Long-term  trend of  the  indicator of the structure of accumulation 
(sa)  and  its components 
(average  annual  % rates  of change  of the exponential  trend  1959-1981)  (1) 
Formula  VI  Formula  VII 
sa  QT/PDT  PKAiPVA  (W/VA)-1  r  QT  PKA/PC  WRL 
Investment  goods 
(a)  excluding construction  -0.87  0.66  0.85  -0.74  -1.63  0.50 
(b)  including  construction  -0.01*  1.55  -0.36  0.06*  -1.27  0.96 
Intermediate goods  4.37  0.93  0.66  0.61  2.17  1.63 
Consumer  goods  3.23  1.32  1.07  -0.60  1.45  1.47 
Manufacturing  1.69  1.19  0.98  -0.76  0.28*  1.03 
Total  industry  2.68  1.35  0.35  0.18*  0.80  1.42  (including  construction) 
(1)  Parameters  b  of the  function 
x = aebt,  or:  Log  x = log  a+ bt 
where  x is each  of the  above  variables,  and  t  is time  (1,  2,  ••••••  23) 
The  'Student'tvaluesareingeneral  very  high  (well  above  5), but  as  the  residuals 
are  autocorrelated,  it is not  possible to carry out  a  rigorous  hypothesis test. 
The  cases  where  Student  t  is  Less  than  2  are  indicated by  an  asterisk. 
0.27 
0.29 
0.57 
0.31 
0.37 
0.46 
====================================================================================== 
Figure  3  :  The  investment  effort  relative to its results  (ratio  QT/PDT) 
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It  is only  in  the  investment  goods  sector,  excluding  construction,  that  capital 
accumulation  has  been  relatively efficient,  for  until  1975  the  ratio  QT/PDT 
fluctuated  round  a  flat  trend.  This  particular  feature  nevertheless  has 
disappeared over  the  Last  few  years,  as  the  ratio  QT/PDT  soared after  1976. 
If enterprises  in this  sector tried to  stem  the  deterioration  in profitability 
after  1979  by  increasing  capital  per  employee,  such  a  strategy apparently  did 
not  pay  off  in  productivity  terms.  When  construction  is  included  in sector  I, 
QT/PDT  shows  an  upward  trend over  the  whole  period:  the  results  in productivity 
terms  were  therefore  always  inadequate  relative to  the  investment  required. 
Sargent  (1968,  1982)  suggests  that  the  persistent  gap  between  invest-
ment  outlay on  the  one  hand  and  its effects  in terms  of  productivity  on  the 
other,  could  be  the  result  of  excessively generous  inaentives  to  investment 
during  the  early  1960s.  These  helped  to drive  the growth  of  the  capital  stock 
above  its equilibrium path  with  respect  to  the growth  of output  per  head. 
This  eventually  pushed  both  capital  productivity and  the  rate of  return  down. 
To  further  the analysis,  one  should  examine  more  closely the  causes  which 
determine  the  level  and  changes  of productivity,  and  link  the  growth  of 
capital  intensity of production  to  the  aim  of  increased control  of  the  produc-· 
tion process  on  the  part  of  management. 
Actual  productivity  performance,  whilst  being  a  function  of capital 
intensity of  production,  is  not  strictly determined  by  it, since  it  is  a  fact 
that  with  similar or  even  identical  plant  and  machinery,  production  can  vary 
widely  (1).  This  absence  of  narrow  correlation stems  in part  from  the  fact 
that  production  is  a  social  process  involving  tension and  struggle,  and  it  is 
inconceivable  that  management  will  ever  have  complete  control  over  these. 
The  poor  productivity  performance  of  British  industry,  compared  to  capital 
intensity of  production,  could  thus  be  explained  by  non  participatory social 
relations,  which  has  promoted  a  growing  resistance  among  workers  to  the 
intensification of work  (Hodgson  1982,  p.  222).  In  this  conflict  model 
interpretation,  the  increase  in  capital  intensity would  reflect  the  attempts 
of enterprises  to  reach  a  more  complete  domination  of  the  work  force.  The 
pursuit  of  this  aim  could  have  been  helped·by  investment  incentives. 
(1)  See,  for  reference,  the  study  review  presented by  Hodgson,  1982. -25-
One  can  argue  moreover  that  this  aim  of breaking  free  from  the  work 
worce  in order  to exert  a  better control  over  the  production  process  is  one  of 
the  fundamental  reasons  which  determine  technical  change  (1).  One  would  there-
fore  expect  some  trend  increase  in the  capital  intensity of  production.  More-
over,  this  movement  has  probably  been  influenced also  by  the  growth  of  Labour 
costs  relative to  the  price of  capital.  It  is,  however,  questionable  whether 
it  is  meaningful  to try  to  establish  an  inverse  and  monotonic  relation between 
the  variation of  relative prices  and  the  variation of the  proportion  of 
inputs  employed(2). 
3.  The  capital  intensity of production  (QT)  increased  in the  same  way 
in sectors  II andiii, reaching  in  1981  a  level  two  and  three quarters  times 
higher  than  in  1959  (see  Table  4).  The  intermediate goods  sector,  which  at 
the start exhibited a  capital  intensity more  than double  that  of the other 
two  sectors,thus  increased its  relative  lead over  sector  I. 
While  showing  relatively  frequent  cyclical  fluctuations,  the 
indicator  in question  rarely fell.  It did so  only  in 1973  and  1974  for all 
sectors,and  in  1960  for  sector I. 
4.  Labour  productivity  rose  at  rather  different  rates,  the  strongest  growth 
being  recorded  in the  intermediate goods  sector.  As  we  have  seen,  this  result 
was  achieved  by  means  of  more  sustained capital  accumulation;  which  overall 
was  nevertheless  less  "inefficient" than  in  the other  sectors.  The  productivity 
index  for  sector  II, although  it was  always  below  the  index  of capital  intensity 
of production,  at  the  end  of the period showed  the  smallest  gap. 
In all  sectors there were  decli.nes  in productivity  in phase  with  the 
troughs  of  the  cycle.  They  were  greater  in 1974-75  and  in 1980,  with  the exception 
of sector  I  (excluding  construction>,  where  productivity  remained  approximatively 
constant  from  1973  to 1978. 
(1)In effect,  industry  has  very  great  advantages  in  having  mechanised  production, 
since  mach1nes  do  not  strike,  cannot  be  absent,  do  not  make  claims  for  wage 
in~reases higher  than  the  rise  in productivity,  etc ••• 
(2)The  inco~sistency of  the  principle  by  which  the  substitution of  factors  is 
governed  by  the  movements  in  the  relative prices  of  factors  has  been  demon-
strated  by  the  debate  on  the  ''reswitching of  techniques'',  which  took  place 
following  the  work  of  Sraffa.  Effectively,  if a  highly  capital  intensive 
technique  which  had  been  abandoned  after  an  increase  in  the  rate of  profit  is 
used  again when  the  rate of  profit  becomes  still higher,  one  can  no  Longer 
say  that  substitution is  inversely  related to  the  price of capital.  On  these 
points,  see  Pasinetti  (chapter  VI). -M-
5.  The  relative prices of capital  advanced  with  respect  to  the  prices 
of value  added  generally  pushed  up  the  indicator of the structure of 
accumulation.  It  is only  in sector  I  including  construction that  the 
reverse occurred,  but  the weight  of this  factor  was  very  slight.  In sector  I 
excluding  construction,  the  influence of  relative prices  was  stronger  than 
that  of technology;  in the other two  sectors  it was  weaker,  but  nearly  as 
important  as  that  of technical  change  (see  table 4  for  the  long-run  trend). 
In  constrast,  if we  consider the  relative prices  of capital  advanced 
with  respect  to  consumer  prices  (the second  method  of breaking  down  the  indicator 
of  the structure of accumulation),we  see that  the  role of this  factor 
remained  negligible,  the  two  price  indices  having  followed  similar paths. 
V.  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  AND  WAGES  PER  EMPLOYEE 
1.  The  share of wages  in  value  added  (wage  share)  was  characterized 
over  the  whole  period  by  a  rising  trend  in sector  I  excluding  construction , 
sector  III and  total  manufacturing,with  very  wide  fluctuations  in the years 
after 1973. 
In sector  II  and  total  industry,  in contrast,  the wage  share 
fluctuated around  a  sluggish  trend  up  to  1973.  There  was  a  sudden  rise  in 
1974  and  1975,  followed  by  a  sharp fall  <1>.  This  rise,,  which  occured  in 
all  sectors,  seems  to  have  been  the  result  of  a  catching-up  process  following 
a  period of  incomes  policy. 
In sector  I,  including  construction,  there  was  no  upward  trend,  the 
most  salient  feature  being  the  exceptional  spread of  fluctuations  in  the 
1970s  (2). 
(1)  In  1981,  for  example,  the  wage  share  in section  II  stood at  52.2%, 
against  65.7%  in  1959  and  72.4%  in  1975. 
(2)  This  is also  shown  in  table  4,  where  it can  be  seen that  the  coefficient 
relating to the  reciprocal  of the  wage  share,  which  is very  low,  is 
not  statistically significant. (5) 
-27-
Construction  and  energy  products,  in contrast  to the other sectors, 
showed  a  sharp decline  in the  wage  share.  In  1981  the wage  share  was  25% 
lower  than  in 1959  in the first  branch,  and  more  than  50%  lower  in the second 
branch. 
2.  This  picture  changes  considerably if account  is taken of the  impact 
of the  rate of turnover of circulating capital  (r).  As  stated earlier,  the 
rise  in this  indicator  reflects  a  reduction  in the  relative weight  of 
circulating  capital  advanced:  all other  things  being  equal,  the share of 
the  stock of circulating capital  for  wages  in  value  added  (w:;>  is  reduced. 
The  converse  is true if r  falls  (the  relative weight  of circulating capital 
increases). 
Table  4 shows  that  in two  cases  the  rate of turnover of circulating capital 
considerably  amplified the movements  of the  relative shares.  This  was  the  case 
for  sector  I  excluding  construction,  where  the fall  in~  strengthened the rise 
in the  wage  share,  and  for  sector  II,  where  the  rise  in~  aggravated the 
fall  in the  wage  share  <T>.  In sector III and  total  manufacturing,  however, 
it  ran  counter to  the  rising  trend  in the  wage  share.  In  section  III,~ rose 
so  sharply that  it overcompensated  for  the  rise  in the  wage  share.  In 1981, 
for  example,  that  share  was  19%  higher  than  in 1959,  while  the share of the 
stock of circulating  capital  for  wages  was  11%  lower. 
3.  The  income  distribution ratio - another  way  of  expressing  the  share 
of wages  in  value  added  (2)  - shows  the  same  cyclical  profile,  with  the 
movements  reversed,  of  course.  The  above  considerations  therefore apply 
"mutatis  mutandis".  The  only  substantial  difference is that  fluctuations 
in the  income  distribution ratio are  wider  than  those  in the  wage  share  (3). 
(1)  For  example,  in  1981  the  index  <1959  =  100)  of the  wage  share  and  of the 
share of stock of circulating  capital  for  wages  was  as  follows: 
W/VA  section  I  (excluding  construction),  117.2;  section II,  79.4 
(W/r)/VA  section  I  (excluding  construction),  176.4;  section II,  49.0 
(2)  The  relationship between  these  two  distribution  indicators  may  be 
expressed as  follows: 
J!.. =  ~-1~--:--~  VA  1 +  (S/W) 
(3)  This  can  be  clearly seen  from  formula  VIII. 
(VIII) -~-
As  a  result,  the  downward  trend  in sector  I  excluding  construction,  sector  III 
and  total manufacturing  brough  the  net  income  distribution  ratio  down  to 
particularly  low  levels at  the  end  of  the  period  (1). 
Con~truction showed  a  very  marked  upward  trend  with  few  cyclical 
fluctu~ions (three cycles:  1959-66;  1966-75  and  1975-80).  In  1981,  the  index 
of the  income  distribution  ratio  (base  1959)  stood at  252.7,  the  peak  for  the 
w.hole  period  (268.8)  having  been  reached  in 1979. 
The  energy  products  branch  first  showed  a  strong  upward  trend until 
1968,  the  income  distribution  ratio having  more  than tripled since 1959. 
From  1968  to 1974  the trend was  reversed;  the extremely  sharp  drop  in 
1974  brought  this  indicator to a  negative  level  <-16).  This  was  followed 
by  a  spectacular  recovery,in  1981  the  income  distribution ratio being  more 
than  15  times  higher  than  in  1959.  In the  energy  products  branch,  in  contrast 
to other sectors,  the  gross  income  distribution ratio  followed  a  very  different 
path  from  the  net  ratio.  From  1959  to 1973,  the  gross  distribution ratio  rose 
steadily  (but  less than  the net  ratio), the  fall  in 1974  was  much  smaller  and 
the  recovery  over  the  last seven  years  was  less  striking. 
4.  The  rise  in the per  capita  real  wage  constantly  lagged  behind  the 
increase  in the  capital  intensity of production  (Table  5).  A comparison  with 
productivity shows  that,  up  to  1973,  real  per  capita  wages  rose  most  of the 
time  at  a  slower  pace  than  productivity.  After  that  period,  the  situation has 
varied greatly between  the  sectors.  The  beginning  of  the  Seventies  was  marked  by 
increased workers'  militancy and  strong  social  conilicts,  which  ended  with  a 
substantial  increase  in  real  wages  (see  Table  6).  From  1974  to  1976,  the 
index  of  the  per  capita  real  wage  (base  1959)  was  higher  than  the  productivity 
index,  except  in  sector  II  (where  this  happened  only  in  1975).  For  manufacturing 
(1)  In  1981  the  index  (1959  = 100)  of this  indicator stood at 
18.7 in section  I  excluding  construction 
31.0 in section III 
17.3  in total manufacturing. -29-
and  sector  I, this  gap  maintained until  1981,  becoming  very  Large  in sector  I 
including  construction.  On  the  contrary,  in sector  III  and  total  industry, 
from  1977  the  productivity  index  once  more  attained a  higher  level  than  the  real 
wages  index.  In  sector  II, this  gap  increased over  time,  becoming  very  large 
by  1981  (see  Table  4). 
Real  per  capita wages  moved  in cycles,  which  can  be  seen  clearly  from 
the  data.  From  1959  to  1970,  all  sectors  showed  three  cycles  (1959-62,  1962-67, 
and  1967-70),  with  an  underlying  low  growth  rate  (2.8 % per  year  for  total 
industry,  see  Table  6).  In  several  cases  (especially total  manufacturing),  the 
troughs  of the  cycle  induced  falls  in the  Level  of  real  wages.  In  the  1970s,  there 
were  two  cycles  (1970-77.and  1977-80)  whose  main  features  were: 
- a  sharp acceleration from  1971  to  1975:  for  total  industry the  average 
annual  rate of  increase  rose  to 4.4%; 
- a  Large  drop  in  1977,  which  brought  real  wages  down  to a  level  close to 
that  of 1974. 
Table  6:  Real  wages  and  nominal  wages  per  employee  -
annual  average  rate of change 
Real  wages  (a)  Nominal  wages 
1959-70  1970-75  1975-81  1959-70  1970-75  1975- 81 
Investment  goods 
(a)  excluding  construction  2.6  4.1  0.7  6.5  17.6  14.7 
(b)  including  construction  2.9  3.9  0.3  6.8  17.4  14.3 
Intermediate goods  2.5  4.8  1.7  6.4  18.5  15.9 
Consumer  goods  3.1  4.7  1.0  7.0  18.3- 15.1 
Manufacturing  2.8  4.1  1.0  6.7  17.6  15.1 
Total  industry  2.8  4.4  1.0  6.7  18.0  15.1 
(a)  Deflator:  retail  price  index 
=================================================================================== 
5.  In  most  sectors  nominal  wages  per  employee  in  1981  were  more  than  ten 
times  the  1959  level.  The  change  in the  pattern of inflation in the  1970s 
caused  a  break  which  implied a  different  picture  for  real  wages.  Up  to 1970 
the  curve  of per  capita  nominal  wages  was  as  "flat" as  the  real  wage  curve, 
but  the acceleration  in  the  early  1970s  (matching  that  of  real  wages)  was  not 
followed  by  any  slowdown  in 1975-50  (Table 6), because of persisting inflation. -30-
The  problem  now  is to determine  the  causes  of the  fall  in the  rate of 
profit.  This  will  be  done  in  two  stages:  first  we  consider  nominal  profitability, 
in order  to measure  the  respective  impacts  of capital  accumulation  and  changes 
in  income  distribution;  then  we  analyse  the effects of  inflation which,  by 
altering  relative prices  against  the  interests of  industry,  restricted its 
profitability. 
VI.  FALL  IN  THE  RATE  OF  PROFIT  AND  CAPITAL  ACCUMULATION 
1.  To  establish  the  causes  in the  fall  of  the  rate of profit  we  have  to 
follow  two  different approaches.  In  the  first,  which  falls  within the  frame-
work  of the  def.inition of the  rate of profit  (formula  II above>,  we  must 
study  the  components  of profitability:  indicator of the  structure of accumula-
tion,  income  distribution ratio,  rate of turnover of circulating capital.  The 
other approach  goes  beyond  this static  framework,and  leads  to an  enquiry  into 
the  reasons  why  value  added  for  the sector  in question  did  not  reach  higher 
levels.  We  must  thus  consider profitability in the  wider  context  of the 
general  economic  situation, and  also take  into account  other  factors,such  as 
relative prices  in  the  sector  (output  prices  compared  with  input  prices). 
Under  the  first approach,  we  see that  two  factors  in  particular have 
exerted downward  pressure on  the  rate of profit.  The  first  is the  rise,  described 
above,  of the  indicator of the structure of accumulation.  The  second  is the 
trend  in  the  income  distribution ratio:  Figure  2 shows  that  in general  this 
ratio has  closely  followed  fluctuations  in  profitability.  We  must  then 
establish the  respective  weight  of each  of these  factors. 
This  was  done  by  estimating  the  long-run  trend of the  rate of profit 
and  of  its components.  For  this purpose,  we  used  the  logarithmic  form  of 
equation  II,  in order  to derive expotential  trend  (1). 
s  1 
(1)  log  p = Log  ( W  )  +  log  (  1 + sa  )  +  log  r -31-
The  estimated parameters,  which·  show  the  average  annual  rate of change  of 
the  Long-term  trend,  allow  us  to break  down  the  variation  in the  rate of 
profit  into its components.  With  a  superscript  point  to  indicate the  rates 
of  change  we  thus  have: 
1 
P = S/W  +  (  1 + sa  )  +  r  (lib) 
Of  course,  since  formula  lib is merely  an  accounting  identity in 
which  all the  variables  are  determined  simultaneously,  it cannot  by  itself 
tell us  anything  about  the  causal  relationships  between  the  variables. 
Nevertheless,  some  indications  to  how  these  Link~  may  be  estab1ished 
have  been  provided  in the  earlier discussion. 
2.  tdble  7 shows  that  for  total  industry  and  in  the  intermediate 
goods  sector,  the  rise  in the  indicator of the structure of accumulation 
was  the  factor  which  had  the greatest  influence on  the profitability trend. 
The  fall  in the  rate of profit  therefore stems  more  from  capital  accumulation 
than  from  changes  in  income  distribution  (1).  This  may  seem  rather surprising 
considering  that  one  of  the most  common  explanations for the  decline  in 
profitability in the  United  Kingdom  is the  profit  squeeze  resulting  from 
wage  increases  (see  Glyn  and  Sutcliffe 1972>. 
In  the  consumer  goods  sector,  capital  accumulation  was  not  the  pre-
dominant  factor  in  the  fall  of profitability,  althoug~ its weight  was  of 
about  the  same  size as  that  of  income  distribution. 
It is only  in the  capital  goods  sector  excluding  construction that  the 
fall  in the  rate of profit  is attributable to wage  increases.  The  trend  in 
this sector  heavily  influenced the  results  for  total manufacturing,  so  that 
here  too  the  decline  in the  rate of profit must  be  mainly  linked with  the 
fall  in the  income  distribution ratio.  In  sector  I  including  construction, 
however,  neither  changes  in  income  distribution nor  capital  accumulation  can 
(1)  It  can  even  be  seen that  over  the  whole  period the coefficient  of the 
income  distribution ratio was  not  statistically significant.  Over  the 
period  1959-1974,  however,  the  influence of changes  in distribution was 
not  negligible,although still much  less  than that  of capital  accumulation. T
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be  seen as  the cause  of  the slight  fall  in profitability  <1>,  which  must  be 
attributed to  the  increased weight  of circulating capital  (fall of  r>.  This 
factor  also played an  important  part  in other cases. 
For  total  industry and  in sector  II, the rise in the  rate of 
turnover  of circulating capital  more  than offset the effects of the fall  in 
the  income  distribution ratio.  It may  be  noted  in passing  that this 
reinforces  the  above  view  on  the  causes  of  the  decline  in profit-
ability.  In  the  consumer  goods  sector,  the  increase  in the  rate of turnover 
of  circulating capital  cancelled out  almost  half of the  downward  pressure 
exerted on  profitability by  capital  accumulation. 
VII.  PROFITABILITY  AND  INFLATION 
1.  There  are  three main  aspects  in the analysis  of  the  impact  of  inflation 
on  industrial  profitability: 
(i)  gains  on  enterprises'  financial  liabilities stemminq  from 
inflation  (2); 
(ii)  inflation and  national  accounts  aggregates;  in particular,  taking 
account  of  stock appreciation; 
(iii)  inflation and  relative price  changes  in the  industrial sector. 
2.  Leaving  aside gains  Cor  losses)  on  financial  assets,  it can  be 
said that  the  national  accounts  already  incorporate the other 
fundamental  effects of  inflation on  profitability.  Fixed  capital  arid 
depreciation at  current  prices  are  shown  at  replacement  cost,  which  reflect 
both  the  increased value  of the  investment  goods  in use  stemming  from 
inflation and  the  increasing  cost  of  replacing  them. 
On  the profit side,  the  national  accounts  conventions  exclude 
profits  resulting  from  the  fact  that  inflation increases  the value  of stocks 
of  raw  materials  and  of finished  products.  There  is a  reason  for  this 
method,  since stock appreciation gives  rise to actual profit only  when 
(1)  This  result  is due  to the  trend  in construction,  where  there was  a  sharp 
increase  in the  income  distribution ratio  (exponential  growth  of 4.63% 
per  year)  which  was  almost  entirely offset  by  the  rise in the  indicator 
of the structure of accumulation,  1+sa  having  risen by  4.3%  per  year.  The 
rate of  turnover  of circulating capital  increased by  1.28%  per  year 
<exponential  trend>.  Over  the whole  period the  rate of profit  thus  rose 
by  1.6%  per  year. 
<2>This  very  important  point  is being  thoroughly  investigated in  wor~ on 
inflation accounting  and  will  not  be  discussed  here. -34-
enterprises  realise the  value  of  their  stock.  As  management  techniques  are  now 
more  sophisticated,  it may  nevertheless  be  assumed  that  most  of  the  time  this 
actually  happens.  It  is  therefore  reasonable  to add  stock appreciation to 
profits.  This  is  also  justified by  the  fact  that  in any  case  inflation  raises 
the  value  of circulating  capital  advanced  measured  at  current  prices,  and 
that  a  proper  calculation of profitability must  not  ignore  its effects on 
the size of profits. 
For  British  industry,  this  adjustment  can  easily be  made  (at  least 
at  aggregate  level)  because  the  CSO  publishes  estimates of  stock appreciation 
for  manufacturing  (1)  as  well  as  for  mining  and  quarrying,  construction,  and 
gas, electricity and  water.  Figure  4  shows  that  for  manufacturing  stock appreciation 
Fig.  4  :  Profitability and  stock appreciation 
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is by  no  means  negligible,and its impact  became  very  important  in the  1970s. 
(1)  Manufacturing  as  defined by  c.s.o.  (until  1981)  slightly differs  from 
"manufacturing"  used  in this  paper  for  purpose  of  comparability  with 
the  E.S.A.,because the  C.S.O.  definition also  includes  coal  and  oil 
products,  which  in the classification adopted  here  fall  under  energy 
products. (6) 
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Even  the  long-run  trend  is modified:  taking  the  whole  period, 
profitability including  stock  appreciation declines  much  less  than  the 
unadjusted  rate of profit  (1);  moreover,  leaving aside  the  drop  in  the 
last  two  years,  the  downward  trend  virtually disappears  (2). 
3.  One  of the  fundamental  features  of  inflation - which  gives  it its 
destabilizing power  - is  the  change  in relative prices  it creates.  Of 
course  this  is  not  a  negative  process  in itself.  For  example,  it is a 
normal  manifestation of the  life cycle of high  technology  products. 
However,  to  be  a  "physiological" phenomenon,  the  relative prices  in a 
sector must  fluctuate  in both  directions.  If it was  found  that 
over  a  Long  period  change  was  always  in the  same  direction  (downwards  for 
example)  this would  be  the  symptom  of a  structural  problem  in the  country 
in question.  This  perverse  process  is precisely what  happened  in British 
industry  (3).  Distortions  in  relative prices  have  given  rise to transfers 
of potential  profits  in two  directions:  (a)  within  the  industrial sector 
itself, towards  the  investment  goods  branches;  (b)  towards  the tertiary 
sector:  retail  distribution of wage goods and other  goods  and  services  in 
the  cost-of-living basket. 
To  gain a  clearer  idea  of  such  transfers of potential  profits, 
the  rate of profit at  current  prices  must  be  compared  with  the  rate of profit 
at  constant  prices. 
(1)  Taking  the  long-run  exponential  trend,  it will  be  noted  that  the  rate 
of profit  including  stock  appreciation declines  by  3.1%  per  year,while 
the  decrease  in unadjusted profitability is  more  than double  (6.4%  per 
year) • 
(2)  Over  the  period  1959-79,  the  rate of profit  including  stock appreciation 
declined by  1.9%  per  year  (exponential  trend),and nominal  profitability 
by  5.3%  per  year. 
(3)  It  has  also  happened  in  Italy  C$ee  doc.  II/63/83 p.  19  et seq.). 
However,  it cannot  be  taken as  occurring generally  since  it has  not  been 
observed  in Germany  (doc.  II/275/82). -36-
For  this purpose,  let  us  write the difference between  these 
two  rates of profit  (dp): 
d  _  VA  - W  _  VAV  - WV 
p - KA  KAV  (IX) 
where  VA  = value  added,at  current  prices 
W  = wages 
KA  = stock of capital  advanced,at  current  prices 
V = volume 
Expressing all  the  data at  constant  prices  (1),  equation  IX  becomes: 
VAV  PV  WV  RP 
dp  =  KAV  (PKA  - 1)  - KAV  (PKA  - 1)  (X) 
Working  on  the provisional  assumption  that  retail  prices  follow 
production prices  Ci.e.~PV =~RP), formula  X appears  as  a  transformation 
of the  rate of profit at  constant  prices: 
PVA  SV 
dp  =  (PKA  - 1)  KAV  (XI) 
where  SV  =profits at  constant  prices  (deflated by  output  prices). 
The  nominal  rate of profit  therefore  diverges  from  the  rate of profit 
at  constant  prices  as  a  function of the  moving  pattern of relative prices. 
In particular,  if for  a  given  rate of profit at  constant  prices  the prices 
of capital  employed  by  an  industrial  branch  increase  faster  than  the output 
prices of  its products  (PV),  this  depresses  the  nominal  rate of profit 
compared  with  the  rate at  constant  prices.  The  inflationary process,  by 
changing  relative prices,  thus  brings  about  a  transfer of potential profits 
from  the  weaker  branches  to the stronger  branches  (investment  goods). 
(1)  Using  the  following  relationships 
VA  = 
KA  = 
w  = 
VAV  PV 
KAV  •  PKA 
WV  •  RP 
where  PV,  PKA  and  RP  are  respectively selling prices,  prices of capital 
advanced  and  retail  prices. -37-
If we  now  abandon  the  assumption  that  production and  retail 
prices  move  together,  we  can  express  the  latter as  a  function of the 
former: 
RP  =  PV  + tf 
Equation  (X)  can  now  be  rewritten as  follows: 
sv  1  KAV 
~  •  wv 
PKA  KAV  (Xa> 
If retail  prices  rise  faster  than  industrial  output  prices 
cS > 0), equation  Xa  shows  that, all  other  things  being  equal,  this 
further  reduces  the  nominal  rate of profit  (1).  This  is because  there 
are  wage  increases  whose  sole purpose  is to compensate  for  the  increase  in 
the  cost  of  living,and which  enterprises  cannot  pass  on  their prices.  By 
this means  the  inflationary process  also exerts  a  perverse effect  on  industrial 
profit  through  transfers of potential  profits to the  branches  of  wage  goods. 
This  point  calls  for  further  comment,  for  the  impression  might  be  given 
that  the  employees'  share of  responsibility  in the  decline of profit, which 
had  been  ruled out  (equation  XI>,  has  now  re-emerged  (equation  Xa). 
It  can  be  said that  employees  are  in  fact  responsible  for  lower 
profits only  when  there  is a  change  in their  relative strength.  For  that 
to  come  about,  it is not  enough  that  there  should  be  a  rise  in  nominal 
wages  representing  the trade  unions'  success  in preserving  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  employees  (2);  there must  also be  an  increase  in  the  real  wage. 
If there  is  no  such  increase  but  we  observe at  the  same  time  a  decline 
in profit, this decline  would  be  attributable to  inflation rather  than  to 
trade  union  claims. 
Let  us  now  see  whether  the  foregoing  is  confirmed  by  the  data  for 
British  industry.  It  should  be  noted  that  the analysis  will  be  based 
on  long-run  tendencies,  and  will  therefore  ignore  purely  short-term 
movements. 
(1)  The  termcr/PKA-measures  fne  re[ative  intensity of the  influence on 
profit of retail  prices  compared  with  the  prices of capital. 
(2)  It  should  be  remembered  that  stable purchasing  power  of wages  is 
also  in the  interest of business  generally,  since  it ensures  that  output 
will  find  markets. -38-
4.  For  this  purpose  we  have  deflated the  rate of profit  (1). 
In  this  way  the  total  wage  and  salary bill  reflects only  changes  in 
the  number  of  employees  and  the growth  in  real  wages;  this makes  it 
easier to  pinpoint  this  latter  element. 
The  argument  that  the  drop  in profitability is attributable to 
the  deterioration  in  industry's  terms  of trade  is  fully  confirmed  by  the 
data  when,over  a  long  period,a  decline  in the  nominal  rate of profit 
is  accompanied  by  a  rising or  unchanged  rate of profit at  constant 
prices.  If the  rate of profit at  constant  prices  also declines,but 
to  a  lesser extent  than the  rate of profit at  current  prices,  the 
argument  applies  only  in part,for the  changing  terms  of trade only  partly 
explain  the  fall  in nominal  profitability.  The  argument  is  invalidated 
when  both  rates  of profit  fall  in parallel. 
The  data  in Table  8  show  that  the  movement  of  relative prices 
has  played a  fundamental  role  in  squeezing  industrial  profit.  It 
can  be  seen that  in the  intermediate goods  sector,  the  consumer  goods 
sector and  total  manufacturing  the  rate of profit at  constant  prices 
fell  much  less  than  nominal  profitability  (2). 
(1)  The  price  indices  used  (base  1975)  are  the  following: 
•  the  implicit  price deflator  for  fixed  capital.  Note  that,as  fixed 
capital  at  current  prices  is valued at  end-of-year  prices,  this 
index  shows  values  slightly above  100  for  the  base  year; 
•  retail  prices  for  wages; 
•  prices of  raw  materials  and  fuel  purchased  by  industry,  for 
intermediate  consumption; 
•  prices of value  added  as  proxy  for  sales prices,  because  a  series 
of these  prices  has  not  been  published. 
Value  added  at  constant  1975  prices,  which  was  used  to obtain the 
price deflator,  was  calculated on  the basis of the  index  of  industrial 
output  at  ~onstant prices  at  factor  cos~published in tbe  1982  Bl~e 
Book  (pp.  20-21). 
(2)  Note  that  for  section  II  the  trend coefficient  for  profitability at 
constant  prices  C-1.03)  is statistically  not different  from  zero. T
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This  result  stems  from  the  fact  that  enterprises  were  unable  to 
pass  on  theirsellingprices(1)  the  higher  cost  of  investment  goods  and 
wage  rises  covering cost-of-living  increases  (2). 
The  case of the  investment  goods  sector  is worth  looking at. 
Excluding  construction,  the  sector as  a  whole  was  to  some  extent  penalized 
by  the  movements  of  relative prices,  as  nominal  profitability fell  more  than 
profitability at  constant  prices.  This  is the  combined  outcome  of varying 
situations  in the  different  branches.  Three  branches  were  clearly 
disadvantaged  by  the  trend of  relative prices,  with  falling  nominal 
profitability and  rising profitability at  constant  prices.  These  were 
mechanical  engineering,  instrument  engineering  and  electrical  engineering. 
In  contrast,  shipbuilding and  vehicles  benefited slightly from  inflation, 
as  nominal  profitability declined  less  than  the  rate of profit at  constant 
prices. 
The  situation is  very  different  if construction  is  included  in 
sector  I,  as  the  sharp rise  in selling prices  for  that  branch  reversed a 
steep downward  trend  in profitability at  constant  prices.  This  determined 
the  trend  for  the  whole  of sector  I  including  construction,  where  it can 
be  seen that  the  sharp drop  in profitability at  constant  prices  C-4.3%  per 
year,  Table  8)  was  accompanied  by  only  a  slight  decline  in the  nominal  rate 
of profit  (only  -1.4%  per  year). 
(1)  The  method  for  estimating  added  value  used  in this study means  that 
the  price deflator  used  closely  reflects  the  trend of output  prices. 
To  determine  value  added  at  constant  prices  we  used  the  index  of  industrial 
production at  constant  1975  prices  which,  as  stated  in  the  1982  Blue 
Book(p.  20>,  is based  on  output. 
(2)  As  wages  in  the  United  Kingdom  are  not  index-linked,it  is not  strictly 
possible to establish  such  a  direct  connection with  the  cost  of  living. 
However,  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  the annual  rounds  of wage  bargaining 
the  cost  of  living  is  a  decisive  factor  in what  the  trade  unions  manage 
to obtain.  Consequently,it  could  be  argued  that  the main  difference 
between  the  British  system  and  the  system  in countries  with  full  or 
partial  automatic  indexation  is that,in the  United  Kingdom,cost-of-living 
increases  are  reflected  in earned  income  with  a  greater time-lag,  i.e. 
annually  rather  than  monthly  or quarterly. -41-
The  movement  of  relative prices  described above  thus  brought  about 
transfers of potential  profits to construction  (and  to another  part of  the 
investment  goods  sector), the  distributive trades  and  other  services  (mainly 
through  rises  in  the  cost  of  living);  the  process  is  shown  in  Figure  5  (1). 
Without  seeking  to deny  the  basic  antagonism  between  profits and  wages,  in 
this  case  it can  be  said that  the  main  enemy  of  industrial  profit  was 
inflation rather  than  wages.  Of  course  this  must  not  be  taken to mean  that 
industrial  prices ought  to  be  further  increased,  as  what  is  needed  is align-
ment  downwards,  not  upwards. 
Figure  5:  Transfers of potential  profits over  the  period 1959-81 
Construction and 
other  equipment  goods 
intermediate goods 
-.  .. -.--... --.---..... _.  ~ ..  ...----------------------.,;' 
wage  goods 
other  consumer  goods 
1- .~-- - - - - I  -~  ... ----- service  inputs  of  industry 
(1)  Agriculture  did  not  benefit  from  transfers of potential  profits, as  farm 
prices  rose  Less  than  industrial  prices. -~-
Part  2 
VIII  PRODUCTION  CYCLES  AND  PROFITABILITY  CYCLES 
1.  The  identification of profitability cycles  did  not  raise any  major 
problems  of method,  because  the movements  reflected by  the  data  are wide 
enough  to  pinpoint  troughs  and  peaks  without  further  elaboration. 
The  volume  of output  (value  added  at  factor  costs)  also  declined 
or  slowed  down  markedly  on  occasion during  the period,  so  that  production 
cycles  can  also be  identified simply  by  examining  the  graph  of absolute 
values.  However,  for  the  purpose  of  studying  the  correlation between 
production and  the  rate of profit,  deviations  from  the  long-term  trend 
of  production  had  to be  measured,  and  this  involved  a  regression to 
establish  the  trend  line. 
In three  cases  the  most  suitable  function  for  the calculations 
was  a  spline  regression:  sector  I  excluding  construction ,  where  the 
trend  changed  in  1972;  sector  I  including  construction  ,  where  the 
trend  changed  in  1971;  and  sector  III, where  the  break  point  was  also  in 
1971.  A linear  function  (no  break  point  )  was  used  for  the  intermediate 
goods  sector,  and  a  polynomial  of  the  second  degree  was  preferable 
statistically  for  total  industry.  The  curve  for  manufacturing  showed 
a  possible minimum  early  in the  period,  in  1962;  the  problem  this  raised 
was  solved by  carrying out  regressions  for  the  sub-period 1959-71. 
2.  For  the  period as  a  whole,  there  were  five  rate-of-profit  cycles 
<see  Table  9).  The  first  three,  during  the  1960s,  each  Lasted  three or 
four  years  (1959  - 62;  1962  - 66;  1966  - 70),  and  they  were  almost  perfectly 
synchronized between  sectors.  The  only  deviations  observed were  during 
the  third cycle,  where  the  trough  for  sector II appears  in 1971,  and  the 
P.eak  for  sector  III  in 1967  (instead of  1968). 
The  cycles  lengthened  in the  1970s,  and  the movements  widened 
considerably  (see  Figures  6  and  7). -43-
3.  In  Line  with  the other  European  countries,  in 1973  there  was  a 
clear  break  in  the  trend of  real  output  in  British  industry.  From  1959  to 
1973,  real  output  expanded  in·the  UK  at  an  annual  average  rate of  around 
3%.  Between  1973  and  1981,  however,  output  contracted on  average.  The 
decline  was  particularly serious  in  the  investment  goods  sector  including 
construction,  where  1981  output  had  fallen back  to  the  1963-64  Level  (1), 
but  it was  almost  as  bad  in  the other  sectors,  apart  from  intermediate 
goods. 
Around  this trend  there  were  five  cycles,each  Lasting  four  to  five 
years.  During  the  1960s,  the  fluctuations  were  fairly  small  and  showed 
regular  and  symmetrical  two-year  upswings  and  downswings.  They  became 
much  wider  in  the  1970s,  with  the  Last  cycle  from  1975  to  1981  being  much 
Longer  than  the earlier ones. 
By  comparing  profitability cycles  with  production  cycles,  we  can  now 
establish  which  of  the  two  model,  "demand/investment"  or  "profits/ 
investment'~ provides  the  better  interpretation of  the  dynamics  of  British 
industry.  More  p~ecisely: 
(i)  if peaks  and  troughs  in  the  rate of  profit  anticipate  peaks  and 
troughs  in  the  volume  of output  by  at  Least  one  period,  the 
"profits/investment"  model  would  seem  to offer a  more  appropriate 
description of  eventsj 
(ii)  if the  production  cycle  anticipates  the  profitability cycle,  the 
"demand/investment"  model  would  be  preferred. 
(1)  This  result  is heavily  influenced by  the  decline of  construction output, 
which  had  returned  in  1981  to  a  Level  equivalent  to  that  reached 
between  1960  and  1961. -44-
Table  9:  Profitability and  production  cycles 
P  r  o  f  i  t  a  b  i  l  i  t  y  (a)  P r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  (c) 
Sector  c y  c  l  e  s  Troughs  P e  a  k  s  c y  c  l  e  s  Peaks  %(b)  %  year 
Investment  goods  I  1959-62  10a9  11.8  1960  I  1959-63  1960 
(excluding  construction)  II  1962-66  8.2  10.2  1964  II  1963-67  1964 
III  1966-70  8.3  9.2  1968  Ill  1967-72  1969 
IV  1Q70-75  5.9  7.3  1972  IV  1972-76  1974 
v  1975-81  0.7  5.9  1978  v  1976-81  1979 
1.6 
, Investment  goods  I  1959-62  13.7  14.9  1960  I  1959-63  1961 
(including  construction)  II  1962-66  12.5  14.7  1964  II  1963-67  1964 
III  1966-70  12.4  14.6  1968  Ill  1967-71  1969 
IV  1970-75  12.5  17.2  1973  IV  1971-76  1973 
v  1975-81  8.7  13.0  1978  v  1976-81  1978/79 
9.4 
Intermediate  goods  I  1959-62  7.2  7.6  1960  I  1959-62  1960 
II  1962-66  6.5  6.8  1964  II  1962-67  1965 
III  1966-71  5.2  5.6  1968  III  1967-72  1969 
IV  1971-75  4.4  4.8  1973  IV  1972-75  1973 
v  1975-•••  1.8  7.3  1981  v  1975-81  1979 
Va  1975-78  1.8  5.3  1977 
Vb  1978-•••  4.9  7.3  1981 
(a)  net  rate of profit  on  capital  advanced; 
(b)  rate of profit  at  the  beginning  of the  cycle,  except  for  the  last  figure,  which 
refers to the  end  of the  cycle; 
(c)  value  added  at  factor  cost  (constant  1975  prices). -45-
Table  9  (continued) 
p  r  o  f  i  t  a  b  i  l  i  t  y  (a)  P r  o  d  u  c  t  i  o  n  (c) 
c y  c  l  Troughs  P e  a  k s  c y  c  l  e  s  Peaks  e  s  %(b)  %  year 
Consumer  goods  I  1959-62  14.5  16.1  1960  I  1959-62  1960 
II  1962-66  12.9  13.9  1964  II  1962-67  1964-65 
III  1966-70  11.2  11 .. 6  1967  III  1967-71  1968 
IV  1970-75  10.4  11.2  1973  IV  1971-75  1973 
v  1975-81  6.2  9.0  1978  v  1975-81  1979 
3.2 
Manufacturing  I  1959-62  12.6  13.3  1960  I  1959-62  1960 
II  1962-66  10.1  11.1  1964  II  1962-67  1964 
III  1966-70  8.8  9.3  1968  III  1967-71  1969 
IV  1970-75  7.7  8.3  1973  IV  1971-75  1973 
v  1975-81  3.2  6.4  1978  v  1975-81  1979 
1.6 
Total  industry  I  1959-62  10.1  10.9  1960  I  1959-63  1960 
II  1962-66  9.1  10.0  1964  II  1963-67  1964-65 
III  1966-70  8.0  8.8  1968  III  1967-71  1969· 
IV  1970-75  7.5  8.9  1973  IV  1971-75  1973 
v  1975-80  4.2  7.5  1978  v  1975-81  1979 
7.1 
(a)  net  rate of profit  on  capital  advanced; 
(b)  rate of profit at  the  beginning  of the  cycle,  except  for  the  Last  figure,  which 
refers to  the  end  of the  cycle; 
(c)  value  added  at  factor  cost  (constant  1975  prices). 
l 
I FIG.  6  RATE  OF  PROFIT  AND 
Total  industry 
0 
facturing  Manu 
0 
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(iii)  if the  cycles  coincide,  no  definite  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from 
annual  data.  In  fact,  synchronized  cycles  would  support  the  case 
for  the  "demand/investment"  model,  but  full  confirmation  requires  a 
study of data  for  shorter  periods  (e.g.  quarterly  data>,because 
the  apparent  synchronization of  cycles  observed  using  annual  data 
may  mask  considerable  time  lags  supporting  the alternative model. 
4.  The  comparison  provides  good  evidence  for  the  "profits/investment" 
hypothesis.  In  fact,  there  is  very  close  correspondence  in  cycle  length 
of  rates  of  profit  and  output,  and  the  production  cycle  is  usually  Lagged 
in  exactly the  way  predicted by  the  model  (see  Table  9  and  Figures  6  and  7) 
(1).  The  quantitative analysis  in  Table  10,  showing  the  results of the  regression 
of  production  cycles  on  profitability cycles  lagged  by  one  year,  confirms  the 
conclusion  (2). 
For  total  industry the  Lag  of one  year  in  peaks  and  troughs  is 
almost  always  apparent.  Exceptions  are observed  (see  Fig.6)  early  in  the 
period  (the  two  peaks  coincide  in  1960),  in  1973  and  1975  (extremes 
coincide),  and  in  the  Last  three years  of the  period,where output  falls 
and  this  is  not  justified by  the  stationary evolution of profitability.  The 
coincidence of  troughs  in  1975  was  probably  due  to  the severe  recession, 
which  decisively affected the  rate of profit.  Because  of these  anomalies, 
good  results  are obtained  from  the  regression of output  on  profitability 
only  for  the  period 1962-79,  with  a  dummy  variable  to offset  the absence  of 
a  lag  in the mid-1970s  (see  Table  10). 
(1)  The  findings  of  a  study  by  the  Confederation of British  Industry 
(quoted  in  Adams  et alii  ,  1982,  p.  115)  confirm  this observation,  as 
they  show  a  clear  connection  between  the  rate of profit and  the  invest-
ment  ratio  in  industrial  and  commercial  undertakings,from  1960  to  1980. 
The  cycles  are  almost  always  lagged  by  one  or  two  years. 
(2)  It should  be  borne  in mind  that  simple  regression  methods  are  not  the  most 
suitable means  of  testing  the  ''profits/investmer:1t"  model,  because  the  lag 
between  profit~bility and  production  may  vary  from  one  cycle to the 
next  in  the  same  sector,  or  peaks  may  coin~ide_~ven if troughs  are 
lagged  as  predicted by  the  mode(.  The  variability of the  lag  (which 
does  not  in  fact  refute  the  model)  causes  non-significant  results 
from  the  regressions. 
On  the other  hand,  considering  the  small  sample  size,  it  is  not  really 
appropriate  to  apply  a  nonparametric  test  in order to establish  whether 
or  not  the  lag  in  the  phasing  of  peaks  and  troughs  is the  result  of  a 
random  process. T
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The  profile of cycles  in manufacturing  is  similar to that  in 
total  industry,  except  that  profitability declined as  well  as  output 
in  the  last  two  years  of  the  period  (see  Fig.6). 
In  the  investment  goods  sector excluding  construction,  there  is 
a  clear  connection  between  the  rate of profit  and  output,  although 
production  was  lagged  by  two  years  from  1972  to  1974.  A dummy  variable 
was  therefore  introduced  into  the  regression to  allow  for  the  effects of 
variability in the  lag  (which  is  not  inconsistent  with  the "profits/ 
investment"  model>,  and  statistically satisfactory  results were  obtained 
(adjusted  r2 =  0.54;  see  Table  10).  The  coefficient of 0.992  for  the 
rate of profit  shows  that  a  one-point  change  in that  rate  leads,  in this 
sector,  to  a  smaller  change  in the  percentage  deviation of production  from 
its trend.  As  the  b  coefficients  in Table  10  show,  for  the other  sectors 
changes  in the  rate of profit  Lead  to much  larger  changes  in production. 
The  connection  between  profitability and  production 
is  even  better  in  the  investment  goods  sector  including  construction.  As 
Fig.  7  shows,  the  only  occasions  where  the one-year  lag  does  not  appear  are 
the  peaks  of 1964,  1973  and  1978.  The  best  statistical fit  is obtained 
using  a  quadratic  function  that  reflects  the operation of an  "acceleration'' 
mechanism:  when  changes  in profitability in this  sector exceed  a  certain 
threshold,  their  relative  repercussions  on  production are amplified. 
The  link  between  the  rate of profit  and  the output  is  not  apparent 
in  the  intermediate goods  sector at  the  end  of the  period,when  the  downswing 
in  the  production  cycle  (1979-81)coincides  with  an  upswing  in  the 
profitability cycle,due  to  developments  in the  energy  products  branch. 
Profitability and  production  cycles  are  more  likely to  coincide 
than to be  lagged  in  the  consumer  goods  sector  (see  Fig.?).  However, 
the  regression using  a  one-year  lag  does  give  fairly  satisfactory results, 
except  for  the  period  1973-75. 
We  now  turn to  a  consideration of the  type of accumulation  that 
underlies  th~se cyclical  movements,  and  of the  development  of the  capital 
intensity of production dealt  with  in  Part  1. -51-
IX  CAPITAL  ACCUMULATION  AND  EMPLOYMENT 
1.  The  relation between  the accumulation of capital  and  employment  is 
summarized  by  the  theoretical  notions  of extensive  capital  accumulation 
(capital  widening)  and  intensive  capital  accumulation  (capital 
deepening).  With  extensive  accumulation,  the  productive  base  is broadened 
with  no  change  in techniques. Capital  intensity and  labour  productivity 
remain  constant,while employment  expands  to match  the  increase  in  capacity. 
With  intensive accumulation,  on  the  other  hand,  investment  occurs  in 
capital  goods  that  increases the productivity of  labour;  the  short-term 
effects of such  investment  may  be  detrimental  to  employment,  since  Less  Labour 
is  required  to  produce  the  same  output  (1).  Intensive accumulation  is  usually 
accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  capital  intensity of  production,  since  the 
installation of  the  new  equipment  means  that  each  employee  will  be  working  with 
a  larger  volume  of fixed and  circulating capital. 
In  practice,  of  course,  accumulation  is  never  purely  extensive or 
intensive  because1 for  continuous  growth,  both  types  of  investment  must  be 
present.  If the  outlook  for  demand  ~s good,  capital  deepening  may  well  be 
accompanied  by  an  expansion  of  the  Labour  force,  as  undertakings  enlarge 
their  productive  base  while  adopting  new,  more  productive  techniques.  It 
is  thus  important  to  identify the  dominant  feature. 
For  this  purpose,  the  rate of  growth  of  net  fixed  capital  stock  at  con-
stant  prices  has  been  broken  down  into:  (i)  the  rate of  growth  of capital  stock 
per  employee,  and  (ii)  the  change  in  employmen~by using  a  similar  procedure 
(1)  It  is usually  argued  that  the  adverse  effect on  employment  is short-lived, 
since  the  labour  shed  by  the  branch  adopting  the  new  technique  will  be 
absorbed  by  the  investment  goods  sector,  which  is  facing  growing  demand. 
This  argument  only  holds  while  expansion  is gathering momentum,  however; 
in  periods  of  slowdown  or  stagnation,  the  adverse  effect  is probably 
predominant. -52-
to that  followed  in  section  IV  <1>.  This  shows  the  extent  to which  capital 
accumulation  has  increased  the  capital  intensity of production  <measured, 
for  the  sake  of simplicity,  as  the  fixed  capital  stock  per  employee~ and 
how  it has  affected employment. 
Figure  8  and  Figure  9  give  a  graphic  interpretation of this 
aspect  of  the  question.  They  compare  the  index  of  net  accumulation  (capital 
at  constant  prices)  with  the  index  of capital  intensity,  the difference 
between  the  two  corresponding  to the  change  in employment.  A positive 
difference  (the  index  of  accumulation  is  higher  than  the  index  of capital 
intensity)  means  an  increase  in employment;  a  negative  difference means 
a  decrease. 
2.  As  Table  11  shows,  capital  accumulation  in  British  industry  has  generally 
involved  capital  deepening~  over  the  period as  a  whole,  the  increase 
in  the  volume  of capital  per  employee  outpaced  the  increase  in the total  volume 
of  fixed  capital  (2).  In  the  intermediate goods  and  consumer  goods  sectors, 
this tendency  was  already  apparent  in  the  1960s;in the  investment  goods 
sector,  it emerged  in the  last  decade. 
(1)  The  starting point  was  thus  the  identity: 
NKV  = (NKV/L)  •  L  (XI) 
where:  NKV  = net  fixed  capital  <volume) 
L  =  employees 
which  has  been  transformed  in  growth  rates <lower  case  symbols) by  estimating 
the  long-run  exponential  trend: 
nkv  = (nkv/l)  +  l  (XIa) 
Net  capital  <NKV)  was  used  rather  than gross  capital  (GKV)  because  the 
broadening  of the  productive  base  (i.e.  net  investment)  is properly 
reflected  only  in the  former: 
Ll NK V = G  F  C  F - D 
where:  GFCF  = gross  fixed  capital  formation 
D  = depreciation 
Changes  in gross  capital,  on  the other  hand,  include  the difference between 
retirements  (RT)  and  depreciation,  and  this  cannot  be  regarded  as 
additional  capacity: 
~GKV = GFCF  - RT 
(2)  Figures  in  the  last  column  of Table  11  indicate  the  nature of accumulation. 
A ratio of over  100  deootes  intensive accumulation;  the  higher  the  figure, 
the  more  intensive the  accumulation.  A ratio of under  100  denotes 
extensive accumulation. -53-
Table  11  Capital  accumulation  and  employment 
(annual  average  rate of  change  of the  exponential  trend)(1) 
Period  NKV  KL  L 
Investment  goods 
(a)  excluding  construction  1959-81  2.23  3.05  - 0.82 
1959-71  2.78  2.50  0.28 
1972-81  1.70  3.68  - 1.98 
(b)  including  construction  1959-81  2.71  3.63  - 0.92 
1959-71  3.46  3.42  0.04 
1972-81  1.92  3.69  - 1.76 
Intermediate  goods  1959-81  3.49  4.85  - 1.36 
1959-71  4.86  5.50  - 0.64 
1972-81  2.16  3.99  - 1.83 
Consumer  goods  1959-81  3.20  5.07  - 1.87 
1959-71  4.06  5.22  - 1.16 
1972-81  1.59  4.58  - 2.99 
Manufacturing  1959-81  3.04  4.15  - 1.11 
1959-71  3.84  3.94  - 0.10 
1972-81  1.88  4.20  - 2.32 
Total  industry  1959-81  3.28  4.56  - 1.28 
1959-71  4.44  4.91  - 0.47 
1972-81  2.03  4.07  - 2.04 
NKV  = net  fixed  capital  stock at  constant  prices 
KL  = net  fixed  capital  stock  per  employee  at  constant  prices 
L  =  employees 
(1)  Parameters  b(·100>  of the  function: 
x =a  •  ebt,  or:  log  x =  log  a+ bt 
(KL/NKV>  % 
136.8 
89.9 
216.5 
133.9 
98.8 
192.2 
139.0 
113.2 
184.7 
158.4 
128.6 
288.1 
136.5 
102.6 
223.4 
139.0 
110.6 
200.5 
where  x  is eacn  of the  above  va.-rta1rles  i"n  turn,  and  t  = time  (1,  2,  •••  ,  23). -54-
FIG.  8  CAPITAL  ACCUMULATION  AND  EMPLOYMENT  (indices  1959=100) 
Total  industry 
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It  is  worth  noting  that  as  accumulation  became  more  intensive 
in the  1970s  (and  particularly during  the  last  cycle),  net  investment  was 
declining.  The  modest  amounts  actually  invested were  thus  devoted  mainly  to 
highly  capital-intensive techniques,  at  the  expense  of  employment.  This 
development  offs~ the  positive difference obtained  in  the  1960s  (except  in 
sector  Ill)  between  the  index  of  accumulation  and  the  index  of capital 
intensity,  and  eventually  Led  to  substantial  negative  differences  (see  the 
shaded  areas  in  Figures  8  and  9).  Adverse  effects on  employment  were  Least 
pronounced  in  the  investment  goods  sector,  where  a  positive difference  was 
maintained until  1974.  The  difference  was  almost  permanently  negative 
(i.e.  employment  declined)  in the  consumer  goods  sector,  where  it  reached 
considerable  proportions  by  1981. 
The  main  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these observations  is  that  an 
all-out  policy to  promote  investment  does  not  solve  the  employment  problem. 
Even  if such  a  policy  restored a  GOP  growth  rate  comparable  to that  of the 
1960s,  the  expansion  of  employment  would  probably  remain  modest  since,  as 
already noted,  the  trend  increase  in  the  capital  intensity of  production 
seems  to  result  from  the  very  nature of the  process  of capital  accumulation, 
where  the  aims  are  to  secure  profits as  well  as  increase  control  of  the  pro-
duction  process.  The  policy  in this  area,  whilst  not  pretending  to subvert 
that  long  run  underlying  movement,  could  however  obtain  some  favourable 
effects  by  a  selective move,  in which  investment  incentives  are  conditional 
upon  the  achievement  of  suitable  job  targets. 
X CONCLUSIONS 
1.  Long-run  profitability in  British  industry displays  a  clear  downward 
trend.  The  cyclical  fluctuations  around  the  trend  were  fairly  small  in  the 
1960s,  but  widened  considerably  in the  following  decade.  Construction, 
where  profitability tended  to  rise until  1972,  and  energy  products,  where 
it has  followed  a  rising  trend  since  1975,  are  exceptions  to  the  general 
rule. -57-
2.  The  two  main  determinants  of the  rate of profit  (income  distribution 
and  the structure of accumu.lation)have  both  exerted  downward  pressure 
on  profitability,  but  not  to the same  extent.  Statistical analysis  shows 
that  in total  industry  and  in  the  intermediate  goods  sector,  the  impact 
of capital  accumulation  (as  measured  by  the  rise  in the  indicator of the 
structure of accumulation)  was  much  greater  than  that  of  income  distribution. 
In  the  consumer  goods  sector,  the  two  factors  were  equally  important  in 
the decline of profitability.  Only  in  the  investment  goods  sector  excluding 
construction,was  the  decline  in  the  rate  ~i profit mainly  attributable to 
increasing wages.  In  the  investment  goods  sector  including  construction,  the 
slight decline  in profitability was  due  to  neither  the  changing  distribution 
of  income  nor  the  capital  accumulation,  but  rather  to  the  increasing  relative 
importance  of circulating capital. 
The  view  that  profitability declines  because  profits are  squeezed 
by  wages  is  not,  therefore,  confirmed  by  the  figures.  It would  appear 
rather  that  capital  accumulation  in British  industry  has  been  excessive  in 
relation  to potential  returns.  It may  be  that  generous  incentives  to  invest-
ment  have  been  one  factor  in this. 
The  inefficiency of  accumulation  is  even  more  striking  if the 
indicator of the structure of  accumulation  is broken  down  into its 
components.  There  is a  persistent disparity between  the  investment  effort 
(measured  as  the  increase  in  the  volume  of capital  per  employee)  and  the 
resulting  productivity gains,  so  that  the  volume  of  investment  required to 
achieve  a  given  productivity gain  is  steadily  increasing. 
3.  Inflation has  affected the  rate of profit  in two  opposing  ways. 
Abstracting  from  gains  on  the  financial  liabiliti·es of undertakings,  the 
major  positive effect  was  stock  appreciation,  which  was  sufficiently 
substantial  in the  1970s  (as  inflation gathered  momentum)  actually to 
influence the  Long-run  trend.  Over  the  period as  a  whole,  profitability 
before  providing  for  stock  appreciation declined  much  less  than  profitability -58-
without  stock  appreciation;  indeed,  its trend  up  to 1979  (i.e.  ignoring 
the  sharp fall  in the  rate of profit  in 1980  and  1981>  was  almost  not 
declining. 
The  negative  effect  of  inflation was  seen  in the  profit  squeeze  due  to 
the  changes  in  relative prices.  In  the  Long  run,  the selling prices of 
intermediate goods,  consumer  goods  and  even  some  investment  goods  (excluding 
construction)  sectors  rose  more  slowly  than either the  price of capital 
advanced  in  the  corresponding  sectors,  or  retail  prices  <1>.  This  meant 
that  potential  profits of most  industrial branches  were  transferred 
to specific  investment  goods  branches  (notably  to  construction), 
to  commerce  and  to other  services  included  in  the  cost-of-Living basket. 
Industrial  profit  was  therefore the  weakest  component  of  aggregate 
profit  in the  British economy,  and  the  major  threat  facing  it stemmed 
not  from  the  increase  in wages,  but  from  the  effects of  inflation. 
4.  A comparison  between  profitability cycles  and  production  cycles 
provides  strong  evidence  for  the "profits/investment" model.  Cycle  lengths 
correspond  very  closely,  with  profitability cycles  generally anticipating 
production  cycles  by  one  year.  This  empirical  study  thus  Lends  strength 
to the  argument  that  the  rate of profit  plays  a  key  role  in determining 
the  level  of  economic  activity,  even  if it is  not  the  only  factor  involved. 
5.  Throughout  the  period,  capital  accumulation  in British  industry  was  of 
an  intensive  form  and  increasingly  so.  The  expansion  of  the  volume  of  fixed 
capital  Led  to  an  increase  in the  capital  intensity of production,  at  the 
expense  of employment.  As  investment  slowed  down  in the  1970s,  this  feature  of 
British  investment  became  more  pronounced.  The  main  purpose  of  the  modest 
investment  carried out  was  to  introduce  highly  capital-intensive techniques. 
In  a  low  rate of  return situation, this only  helped  to  aggravate  the  unemploy-
ment  problem.  The  efficiency of capital  accumulation  in  terms  of  both  productiv-
ity and  employment  has  been  falling. 
Any  policy to  promote  investment  as  a  remedy  for  unemployment  thus  needs 
to be  selective.  In particular,  government  grants  and  other  advantages  should 
be  strictly conditional  on  the achievement  of  job  targets.  General  incentive 
str~cture appears  to  be  inappropriate as  a  solution to  the  employment  problem. 
(1)  The  comparison  with  retail  prices  is  ~elevant even  though  wages  and 
salaries are  not  automatically  index-Linked  in  the  UK,  because  the  rise 
in the  cost  of  Living  is a  determining  factor  in annual  wage  negotiation. -59-
A N N E X  I 
SOURCES  AND  METHODS 
1.  The  sources  of the  data  used  in this  study  were  national  accounts 
and  input-output  tables,  supplemented  by  censuses  of  industrial  production. 
Figures  for  net  capital  stock  and  depreciation were  supplied by  the 
c.s.o.  (1).  As  the  figures  for  manufacturing  industry are  broken  down  into 
eleven sectors  (instead of  seventeen)  two  groups  had  to be  further  broken 
down  to provide  a  consistent  classification.  They  were: 
(i)  "other metals,  engineering  and  other metal-using  industries"  (2), 
which  mainly  covers  investment  goods;  two  headings  covering 
intermediate goods  had  to be  distinguished:  non-ferrous  metals,  and 
other metal  products; 
(ii)  "leather,  clothing  and  other manufacturing",  which  mainly  covers 
consumer  goods,  but  also  includes  a  branch  of  the  intermediate goods 
sector  <"other  manufacturing  industries", order  XIX). 
The  c.s.o.  data  were  broken  down  using  the branch  structure estimated by 
A.G.  Armstrong  (1979). 
<1>  The  author  is  indebted to Mr.  R.I.  Armitage  for  these data,  as  well  as 
for  invaluable  help with  other data. 
(2)  This  group  covers  the  following  orders  and  m1n1mum  list headings  from 
the  UK's  Standard  Industrial  Classification:  mechanical  engineering 
(Order  VII),  instrument engineering  (Order  VIII),  electrical  engineering 
(Order  IX),shipbuilding  and  marine  engineering  <order  X),  non-ferrous  metals 
(MLH  321-323)  and  metal  goods  not  elsewhere  specified  (MLH  390-399). -00-
2.  Stock  Levels  were  calculated on  the basis of the book  value  at 
the end  of 1981,  by  subtracting  annual  changes.  This  case  too  raised a 
problem  of breakdown,  since  figures  for  stocks  in manufacturing  are 
broken  down  into only  six groups  in the  Blue  Book. 
Detailed  figures  of book  values  for  the seventeen manufacturing 
branches  for  1973-79  were  supplied by  the  Department  of  Industry and  Trade 
(1),  as  were  figures  for  annual  change  in the six groups  since 1959. 
Detailed figures  for  1959-72  were  obtained by  extrapolation of the 
structure of each  group  resulting  from  production  censuses.  Since  censuses 
refer only  to 1958,  1963  and  1970,  the  group  structure of the  intervening 
,years  was  estimated by  linear  interpolation. 
3.  Detailed  figures  for  the  value  added  at  factor  cost  of the 
manufacturing  branches  also  had  to be  estimated  for  certain years.  Figures 
for  total  manufacturing  are  published every  year  in the  Blue  Book,  but 
the  breakdown  into seventeen branches  is  not  given  for  the  1960s,  except 
where  input-output  tables  are  available,  i.e.  for  1963  and  1968.  Figures 
for  the  rest  of the  decade  were  estimated by  Linear  interpolation of  the 
percentage  share of  each  branch  in the total.  The  breakdown  of  net  output 
in production censuses  was  used  for  estimates  for  1959-62. 
Figures  for  total  manufacturing  and  detailed figures  by  branch, 
where  available,  were  taken  from  the  Blue  Book  as  follows: 
- figures  for  1959-66:  from  the  1970  edition; 
figures  for  1967-68:  from  the 1974  edition; 
- figures  for  1969:  from  the 1980  edition; 
figures  for  1970:  from  the  1981  edition; 
figures  for  1971-81:  from  the  1982  edition. 
4.  The  same  editions of  the  Blue  Book  were  used  for  figures  on  wages 
and  salaries.  Detailed figures  are  available since 1959,  but  they  do  not  include 
employers'  contributions,  which  are given separately as  an  aggregate  for  total 
manufacturing.  This  aggregate  was  broken  down  by  applying,to each  branch, 
the  percentage of  social  contributions  with  respect  to wages  in  total 
manufacturing. 
<1>  The  author  thanks  for  this  information  Mr.  D.T.  Adams  and 
Mr.  O.P.A.  Black. -61-
5.  Intermediate  consumption  was  estimated on  the basis of  its share 
in output  obtained  from  the  input~output tables.  Since  these  tables  are 
published only  for  six years  (1963,  1968,  1970,  1971,  1972  and  1974),  the 
following  procedures  were  used: 
(i)  for  intervening years,  by  interpolation of  known  input-output 
coefficients; 
(ii)  for  1959-62,  by  extrapolating back  the  trend of 1963-68,  with  adjust-
ments  for  certain branches  when  the  findings  were  not  plausible 
because  changes  over  the  whole  period were  too  large; 
(iii)  for  1975-79,  production  was  estimated  <and,subsequently,  intermediate 
consumption>  by apply1 ng the rate of growth  of gross  output  provided 
by  production  censuses  to  input-output data. 
6.  Intermediate  consumPtion was deflated using  the  price  index  of 
materials  and  fuel  purchased  by  manufacturing  industry,  ba~e 1975.  As 
the  index  based  in  1975  is available only  from  1974  onwards  C1n  the  Annual 
Abstract  of  S~at1st1cs), two  problems  arose: 
(a)  the problem  of  re-basing:  earlier  indices  used  base  years  1970, 
1963  and  1954; 
(b)  the  problem  of breakdown:  indices  for  the  years  prior to 1974  are 
more  highly  aggregated. 
For  want  of a  better solution,  the first  problem  was  dealt  with 
by  applying  the  rates  of change  observed  in the other  indices  to the  index 
based  in  1975.  The  second  problem  was  solved by  applying  the  index  for 
total manufacturing  (excluding  food  products)  to the branches  for  which  the 
Business  Statistics  Office does  not  publish  a  separate  index. 
On  balance,  the margin  of error  is probably  small. 
The  rebasing  problem  also  arose  in connection  with  the  retail  price 
index;  it was  dealt  with  in  the  same  way. -62-
7.  The  sectoral  classification for  this  study  was  based  on  the  main 
use  of the products  concerned,  with  special attention being  paid  to 
international  comparability. 
The  composition  of  the  three sectors  is as  follows  (UK  Standard 
Industrial  Classification Orders  are  given  in brackets): 
Sector  I,  investment  goods:  1.  mechanical  engineering  (VII); 
2.  instrument  engineering  (VIII>;  3.  electrical  engineering  (IX); 
4.  shipbuilding and  marine  engineering  (X);  5.  vehicles  (XI>;  6.  construction 
(XX). 
Sector  II,  intermediate goods:  1. mining  and  quarrying  (II>; 
2.  coal  and  petroleum  products  (IV>;  3.  chemicals  and  allied  industries 
(V);  4.  metal  manufacture  (VI);  5.  metal  goods  not  elsewhere  specified 
(XII);  6.  bricks,  pottery,  glass,  cement  etc.  (XVI);  7.  paper,  printing and 
publishing  (XVIII);  8.  other manufacturing  industries  (XIX);  9.  gas, 
electricity and  water  (XXI>. 
Sector  III,  consumer  goods:  1.  food,  drink  and  tobacco  (Ill); 
2.  textiles  (XIII>;  3.  leather,  Leather  goods  and  fur  (XIV);  4.  clothing 
and  footwear  (XV>;  5.  timber,  furniture etc.  (XVII). -63-
A N N E X  II 
FINDINGS  OF  OTHER  STUDIES  ON  PROFITABILITY  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
1.  There  is a  highly-developed  body  of empirical  research  into 
profitability in  the  United  Kingdom,  based  on  complementary  sources  of 
statistics  <national  accounts  and  corporate  balance-sheets),  and  taking 
account  of government  action to  improve  the  rate of profits.  Some  of 
the  studies,  such  as  Clark  and  Williams  (1978),  cover  very  Long  periods. 
Regular  surveys  have  been  carried out  by  the  Department  of  Industry  since 
1974  and  the  Bank  of  England  since  1976. 
All  the  Literature  confirms  the  finding  of this  study:  the  pre-tax 
rate of profit  and  the share of profits  in  value  added  follow  a  long-run 
declining  trend.  But  it also  shows  thqt  the  rate and  the  share of profits 
after  tax  have  developed  quite differently,  being  remarkably  stable until  the 
end  of  the  1960s.  While  post-tax  profitability fluctuated  much  more  widely 
in the  1970s,  it was  often  higher  than pre-tax profitability. 
2.  a)  The  period  covered  by  the  most  recent  studies  published  by  the 
Department  of  Industry and  the  Bank  of  England  is  1960-81.  The  annual 
analyses  they  contain cover  industrial  and  commercial  companies  as  a  whole 
and  total  manufacturing;  they  have  also been  supplemented  by  a  sectoral 
breakdown  of manufacturing  (1).  The  sources  of the  data  are  national 
accounts  and  a  sample  of  balance sheets of  large  companies. 
Fixed  capital  and  depreciation are  recorded  in  the balance  sheets 
either at  historic  cost  or  at  book  values,  which  take account  of  periodic 
revaluations of  company  assets.  In  the  national  accounts,  on  the other  hand, 
fixed  capital  and  depreciation are given  at  replacement  costs. 
-(1)  See  Walker  (1974),  Department  of  Industry  (1979)  and  Williams  <1979), 
where  manufacturing  industry  is broken  down  into six sectors.  In 
Williams  <1981),  manufacturing  industry  is broken  down  into  seventeen 
branches,  and  figures  are also given  for  construction and  four  services 
sectors:  transport  and  communications;  wholesale  trade;  retail  trade; 
miscellaneous  services. -64-
The  c.s.o.  also  calculates  fixed  capital  and  depreciation at  historic 
costs,  to ensure  comparability  with  balance-sheet  data.  The  range  of  rates 
of profit  that  can  be  claculated on  the  basis of these different  sets of 
figures  is quite  large  (1). 
On  the  basis of national  accounts  data,  we  have: 
(i)  Gross  and  net  profitability on  capital  advanced  (fixed capital 
plus  stocks>  at  historic  costs:  fixed  capital  concerns  reproducible 
assets  (plant  and  machinery,  vehicles,  and  buildings)  but  does  not 
include  land;  its value  is  estimated using  the  permanent  inventory 
method.  Stocks  are estimated at  book  values,  which  correspond  to 
historic  costs.  Profits  are  made  up  of  the operating  surplus, 
including  stock  appreciation.  The  gross  rate of profit  is obtained 
by  dividing  the  gross  operating  surplus  by  gross  capital; 
(ii)  Actual  gross  and  net  profitability at  replacement  costs:  this  involves 
the  usual  national  accounts  definition of profits  net  of stock 
appreciation  (2). 
The  rate of profit  obtained  from  balance-sheet  data  is based on  the 
book  values  of  trading assets.  Capital  comprises  fixed  capital,  intangible 
assets  and  all other  net  assets  (i.e. total  assets  minus  the  corresponding 
liabilities,  in particular  loans  and  bank  credits).  On  the  basis of balance-
sheet  data,  the  Monopolies  and  Mergers  Commission  calculates  the  value  of 
total  assets  at  historic  and  at  replacement  costs. 
The  other  indicator  used  in  work  by  the  Department  of  Industry 
and  the  Bank  of  England  is  shareholders•  interest;  capital  in this  case  is 
mainly  shares  and  reserves  net  of  intangible assets. 
(1)  For  a  detailed description,  see  Walker  (1974). 
(2)  In  the  UK  terminology,  the  term  "real"  is  used  (somewhat  misleadingly)  to 
qualify  profits  net  of stock  appreciation. -65-
The  Department  of  Industry  publishes  pre-tax  rates  of profits  <1>, 
while  the  Bank  of  England  publishes  both  pre-tax  rates  and  estimated post-
tax  rates  (2) • 
b)  The  findings  of these  studies  usefully  supplement  the  information 
in this paper.  The  extra details  mainly  concern  post-tax profitability and 
profitability based  on  historic  costs. 
Post-tax  profitability in  the  1960s  showed  cyclical  fluctuations 
similar to  those  observed  for  pre-tax profitability around  a  Long-run  trend 
that  was,  however,  quite stable.  Over  more  recent  years,  the  fluctuations 
have  widened,  and  post-tax profitability has  even  exceeded  pre-tax 
profitability. 
Profitability calculated on  the  basis of historic  costs  shows  no 
declining  long-run  trend;  in fact,  such  profitability actually  rose  quite 
considerably  in the  1970s. 
b.1) 
b.1 .. 1) 
The  following  detailed  remarks  can  be  made 
Manufacturing 
national  accounts  approach  (pre-tax) 
- the  long-run  trend of the  net  rate of profit  excluding  stock 
appreciation on  capital  advanced  has  declined;  cycles  were  identical  to 
those  identified  in this  paper  for  manufacturing  (DIT  (1982),  p.86); 
the gross  rate of  profit  (pre-tax,  excluding  stock  appreciation)  showed 
the same  cycles  as  the  net  rate,  but  the  long-run  decline  was  Less  pronounced: 
the  index  for  the gross  rate  (1960  = 100)  stood at  32.1  in 1981,  compared 
with  15.9  for  the  net  rate.  The  gross  rate  was  lower  than  the  net  rate 
until  1973  (except  in 1970,where  they  were  identical);  it was  higher  than 
the  net  rate  from  1974  to  1981.  By  1981,  the gross  rate  was  3.6%,  while 
the  net  rate  was  2.1%  (DIT  (1982)',  p.86); 
<1>  Walker  <1974)  also gives  shareholders'  interest  for  large manufacturing 
companies  from  1955  to  1972  (pp.  41  and  44). 
(2)  The  post-tax  rate of profit  is calculated  in  two  different  ways,  depending 
on  how  taxes  and  investment  grants  are  treated.  We  thus  have: 
(i)  backward-Looking  profitability,which  is  computed  from  the  allowances  in 
force  when  the asset  was  installed.  When  tax  provisions  enable  companies 
to deduct  new  investment  from  taxable profits,  the  capital  advanced  is 
Lower,  since  a  part  of  it is  financed  by  the government.  The  rate of 
profit  is  thus  calculated after  reducing  capital  by  this amount; 
(ii)  forward-looking  profitability,  a  proxy  for  the  expected  rate of  return 
on  new  capital,  which  is based  on  the  current  tax structure and  investment 
allowances.  (See  Flemming,Pryce  and  Ingram  (1976),  pp.  39-41.) -66-
- the  net  rate of profit  including  stock appreciation  is  identical  to 
that  found  in this  paper  (fig.3)  (DIT  (1979>,  p.631>; 
- the  net  rate of profit  based on  historic  costs,  including  stock 
appreciation,  does  not  show  the  same  Long-run  decline.  It developed  in 
two  stages:  from  1960  to  1967,  it  feLL  from  18.4%  to 12.6%;  from  1968 
to  1978  (the  Last  year  covered  by  the  DIT  study),  it rose  again to  14.9% 
(having  reached  16.3%  in  1977)  (DIT  (1979)  p.631). 
b.1.2)  Balance-sheet  approach  (pre-tax) 
- the  long-run  trend of  the  net  pre-tax  rate of profit,  excluding  stock 
appreciation,  on  the  basis of assets  at  replacement  costs  declined 
exactly  in  Line  with  the  corresponding  trend established using  the  data 
of national  accounts,  although  cyclical  fluctuations  were  more  pronounced. 
The  same  is true of profitability  including  stock appreciation  (DIT  (1979) 
p.632); 
the  net  rate of profit  on  the  basis  of historic  costs  developed  in the 
same  way  as  the  rate based  on  national  accounts  data,  the  main  difference 
being  that  the  balance-sheet  approach  gives  a  much  more  pronounced  rise  in the 
1970s,  so  that  the  rate  for  the  final  year  of  the  period  is  higher  than 
the  1960  rate  (DIT  (1979)  p.632). 
b.2)  Non-financial  enterprises  (1) 
b.2.1>  National  accounts  approach  (pre-tax) 
gross  and  net  profitability excluding  North  Sea  gas  and  oil  followed  the 
same  trend as  profitability  in manufacturing  industry  (DIT  <1982) 
pp.  85-86); 
gross  and  net  profitability  including  North  Sea  gas  and  oil  was 
distinguished by  a  much  less  pronounced  decline  in the  last  three years 
of the  period  (DIT  (1982)  pp.  85-86); 
(1)  work  by  the  Bank  of  England  covers  all  industrial  and  commercial 
enterprises,except  those  involved  in  North  Sea  oil exploitation. -67-
- the  share  of  net  profits  in  national  income  over  a  very  long  period 
(from  1920  to  1977;  Clark  and  Williams,  1978)  (1)  shows  no  declining 
trend until  the  end  of  the  1960s,  after which  a  sharp drop  occurred. 
b.2.2)  Balance-sheet  approach  (pre-tax  and  post-tax) 
- net  pre-tax profitability, excluding  stock appreciation,  on  the  basis of 
replacement  costs  developed  in parallel  to the  same  variable  in 
manufacturing  industry  (Bank  of  England  <1982)  p.243); 
- net  backward-looking  post-tax profitability, excluding  stock appreciation, 
on  the  basis of  replacement  costs  showed  quite a  different  trend  (Flemming 
et  alii  (1976)  p.42;  Bank  of  England  <1982)  p.243;  see  Fig.10  for  a 
representation of the  findings  of  those  two  studies).  The  long-run  trend 
was,  indeed,  declining,  but  much  more  slowly;  until  1974  profitabilityfluctuated 
aroundaflattendency.since  1974,  post-tax profitability has  been  as 
high  as  pre-tax profitability, or even  higher,  except  in  1975.  This 
demonstrates  the  importance  of Government  action to  support  profits, 
which  began  to  take effect  as  early as  1971:  from  1959  to  1970,  the  gap 
between  pre-tax  and  post-tax  rates  of profits  was  narrowing  slightly; 
after  1971  it became  very  small  (see  Fig.10); 
- pre-tax  profitability on  the  basis of historic  costs,  including  stock 
appreciation,  showed  no  Long-run  decline.  There  were  three distinct 
sub-periods:  the  rate declined  from  1960  to  1967,  rose  rapidly  from 
1968  to 1978,  and  fell  so  fast  from  1979  to  1981  (expecially  in  1980) 
that  it  reached  a  minimum. 
3.  The  long-run  decline  in  the  rate of profit  is  also  found  by  Barou 
(1976  and  1978)  and  by  King  and  Mairesse  <1978). 
Barou's  studies  cover  the  period  from  1949  to  1974,  and  relate to 
all  non-financial  undertakings  and  to  industry,  broken  down  into  five  sectors 
(investment  goods;  intermediate goods;  consumer  goods;  construct1on;  energy, 
transport  and  communications).  Profitability is  calculated on  the  basis of 
national  accounts  for  both  gross  and  net  profits on  capital  advanced  (fixed 
(1)  Net  profits are  calculated using  depreciation at  both  historic  and 
replacement  costs. -68-
Fig.  10  Net  rates of profit  on  assets 
Industrial  and  commercial  companies 
•••  SIR  1151  lta  1965  1957  1951  l~t 
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~  BACKWARD·LOOKlNG,  ~RE•TAX 
- -··  BACKWARD  LOoK1N6,  'OST-TAX 
197~  19'?1  19?7  19'79  1981 
capital  plus  stocks).  In  the  first  study,  which  covers  all  undertakings  and 
total  manufacturing,  the  rate of profit  is  broken  down  into:  (i) the share of 
profits in value added;  (ii) the productivity of capital; (iii) the relative price of 
value  added  with  respect  to  the  price of capital  (1).  In  the  second  study, 
where  industry  is  disaggregated,  the  formula  for  the  rate of  profits  is  very 
similar to that  adopted  in this  work  (2). 
(1)  s  s 
p  = K =VA 
¥AVO  --. 
KVO 
PVA 
PK 
where:  s  = operating  surplus 
K  = fixed  capital 
VA  =  value  added 
PVA  = value  added  prices 
PK  = prices  of capital 
VO  =  volume 
(2)  Ba rou  uses  the  formula: 
p =  ~ =  ~~~ -69-
The  decline  in the  share of  profits  is  apparent  only  from  1960 
onwards  in  total  manufacturing,  and  only  from  1968  onwards  in 
the  enterprises  sector as  a  whole  (Barou  1976  p.13>.  Relative  prices  of 
value  added  in manufacturing  remain  fairly stable until  1961,  after which 
they  begin  to deteriorate  (id.  p.12>. 
The  productivity of  capital  in manufacturing  deteriorates steadily, 
with  the  1974  level  being  18io  down  on  the  1950  level;  in  the  enterprises 
sector,the deterioration does  not  begin  until  1964.  This  inefficiency of 
accumulation  is the  result,  in particular,  of:  1)  the  fact  that  the 
rural  exodus  had  already  led  to  some  productivity gains  in  the  UK  before  the 
war;  2)  the  weakness  of  investment  (out-of-date plant  and  machinery),  its 
unsuitable  regional  and  sectoral  distribution and  the  inefficient  way  in 
which  it was  used  (in unsuitable buildings  and  with  unsuitably qualified 
labour>;  3)  working  conditions:  restrictive practices  and  restraints on  the 
extension of shift  work  (Barou  (1976>,  pp.  11-12). 
King  and  Mairesse  (1978>  cover  manufacturing  (except  food  products 
and  tobacco,  and  metal  manufacturing)  from  1956  to  1975,  on  the basis of 
national  accounts.  The  sectoral  breakdown  of  industry  into  investment 
goods,  intermediate goods  and  consumer  goods  is similar to that  in this paper. 
The  net  rate of profit  on  capital  is calculated before  and  after tax. 
The  authors  carry out  several  regressions.  First  they  relate  rates 
of profits to time,  to establish whether  there  is  a  long-run  declining  trend. 
To  this  independent  variable  is added  successively: 
(a)  the  rate of  capacity utilization; 
(b)  a  dummy  variable with  a  value  of 1  from  1969  to 1975,  so  as  to 
allow  for  the abnormal  fall ·of  profitability during  that  period. 
This  fall  was  apparently  due  to  a  slow  change  in methods  of price-
fixing  based  on  historic  cost  when  inflation started to  increase  in 
the  late  1960s.  By  the  time  the  principle of "inflation accounting" 
had  been  recognized ,price control  had  been  introduced. 
The  parameters  of the  regressions  are statistically significant  for  . 
the  time  and  the  dummy  variables,  but  usually  not  significant  for  the  capacity 
utilization rate. -m-
4.  ~and  Sutcliffe  (1972)  calculate the  share of pre-tax profits 
in  the  net  value  added  of all  undertakings  from  1950  to 1969,  and  the  rate of 
profits on  net  corporate assets,  so  as  to  provide  empirical  evidence  for  their 
interpretation of  the  crisis  in  the  UK  economy.  They  argue  that  the crisis 
is due  to  a  profit  squeeze  resulting  from  wage  increases after 1965,  and  from 
stronger  international  competition,  which  prevented  undertakings  from 
passing  on  prices  the  rise  in their costs. 
King  (1975)  criticizes Glyn  and  Sutcliffe's approach  by  stressing 
the  importance  of taxation  when  considering  the  share of  profits:  from 
1950  to  1973,  the  share of post-tax profits  in manufacturing  as  a  whole 
hardly  showed  a  declining  trend  <1>.  Indeed,  if stock appreciation  is taken 
into account,  the  profit  share  until  1970  (King  (1975>,  pp.  42  and  40).  These 
stable over  the  Long  period.  Ignoring  stock appreciation,  King  does  not 
find  a  decline  in the  profit  share  until  1970  (King  (1975),  pp.  42  and  40).  These 
findings  are  compatible  with  those of the  Bank  of  England  <1982)  for  the 
post-tax profit  rate  (see  Fig.10). 
<1>  The  author  excludes  metal  manufacturing  to eliminate the  effects of 
nationalizing  the  steel  industry. A
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